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Analyzing Vertical Mergers: Accounting for the 
Unilateral Effects Tradeoff and Thinking Holistically 
About Efficiencies 
Roger D. Blair, Christine S. Wilson, D. Daniel Sokol, Keith Klovers & Jeremy A. 
Sandford* 
Introduction 
Vertical mergers are once again a hot topic. Over the past several 
years, commentators have vigorously debated whether the approach 
traditionally taken by the US Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) and US 
Department of Justice Antitrust Division (“DOJ”) (collectively, the 
“Agencies”) is fully aligned with economic thinking that is both au courant 
and administrable. Recently, talk has turned to action: in the past three 
years, DOJ litigated the first agency-led vertical merger challenge in 
approximately forty years,1 the Agencies held the first public hearings on 
vertical mergers in many years,2 and the Agencies issued new Vertical 
Merger Guidelines, the first jointly issued agency guidance on the topic.3 
In these discussions, some argue that vertical mergers pose at least the 
same anticompetitive potential as their horizontal brethren, and therefore 
 
 * Roger D. Blair is the Huber Hurst Professor and Departmental Chair, Department of Eco-
nomics, University of Florida. Christine S. Wilson serves as Commissioner, US Federal Trade Com-
mission. D. Daniel Sokol is a Professor of Law, University of Florida Levin College of Law and Senior 
Advisor, White & Case LLP. Keith Klovers is Of Counsel, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati LLP. Jer-
emy A. Sandford serves as Economic Advisor to Commissioner Wilson, US Federal Trade Commission. 
The views expressed herein are our own and do not necessarily reflect the views of our institutions, 
including the US Federal Trade Commission, or any other Commissioner. 
 1 See United States v. AT&T Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 161, 193–94 (D.D.C. 2018), aff’d, 916 F.3d 1029 
(D.C. Cir. 2019). 
 2 See FTC Hearing #5: Vertical Merger Analysis and the Role of the Consumer Welfare Standard in 
U.S. Antitrust Law, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (Nov. 1, 2018), https://perma.cc/P7SW-3LWD; Public 
Workshops on Draft Vertical Merger Guidelines, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIV. (June 26, 2020), 
https://perma.cc/2KV9-2TE3. 
 3 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, VERTICAL MERGER GUIDELINES (2020), 
https://perma.cc/389K-H8FP. 
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deserve equal skepticism and scrutiny.4 Yet, this view is at odds with most 
of the economic literature, which generally finds that vertical mergers 
(and restraints) generate greater procompetitive benefits than horizontal 
mergers, typically making them, on net, procompetitive. First and 
foremost, vertical mergers allow the merged firm to eliminate a markup it 
would otherwise pay a supplier; this dynamic is called the elimination of 
double marginalization (“EDM”). Whereas EDM is an inherent or 
unilateral effect, vertical mergers also produce a number of standard 
efficiencies, like more efficiently allocating risk and incentivizing asset-
specific investments, which benefit consumers by expanding output. 
This is not to say that all vertical mergers and restraints are lawful. 
Vertical mergers may also allow a firm to engage in anticompetitive 
conduct, like raising rivals’ costs (“RRC”), complete foreclosure, or misuse 
of information. Yet RRC and EDM are both inherent, unilateral 
competitive effects—two sides of the same coin—even if they do not 
necessarily share equal magnitude. As a result, the economic literature 
finds that a vertical merger’s aggregate procompetitive benefits are likely 
to exceed its anticompetitive effects across a wide range of—but not all—
possible scenarios.5 
Yet the law has not always followed the economics, and sometimes 
has explicitly parted ways with it. In the mid-twentieth century, the law 
viewed efficiencies as either irrelevant or anticompetitive, and it therefore 
condemned many vertical mergers.6 Of course, this was the same era when 
comprehensive sectoral regulation was celebrated despite its destructive 
consequences for consumers, the originally intended beneficiaries of 
these byzantine legal frameworks.7 
 
 4 See, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker, Nancy L. Rose, Steven C. Salop & Fiona Scott Morton, Five Princi-
ples for Vertical Merger Enforcement Policy, 33 ANTITRUST 12, 14 (2019) (“[E]nforcers also should not set 
a higher evidentiary standard for finding anticompetitive harms from a vertical merger than it applies 
when reviewing horizontal deals.”). 
 5 See, e.g., D. Bruce Hoffman, Acting Dir., Bureau of Competition, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks 
on Vertical Merger Enforcement at the FTC at Credit Suisse 2018 Washington Perspectives Confer-
ence 4 (Jan. 10, 2018), https://perma.cc/W9TW-R5F6 (“To summarize, overall there is a broad consen-
sus in competition policy and economic theory that the majority of vertical mergers are beneficial 
because they reduce costs and increase the intensity of interbrand competition. That consensus has 
support in the empirical research. Does that mean all vertical mergers are benign? No, it doesn’t.”). 
 6 See infra Section II.A. 
 7 See, e.g., Christine S. Wilson & Keith Klovers, The Growing Nostalgia for Past Regulatory Misad-
ventures and the Risk of Repeating These Mistakes with Big Tech, 8 J. ANTITRUST ENF’T 10, 12–14 (2019) 
(recounting the genesis and early history of the Interstate Commerce Commission and Civil Aero-
nautics Board). 
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Ultimately the tide shifted with economic analysis leading the way.8 
Year by year, the economic evidence has indicated ever more clearly that 
vertical integration—whether by merger or otherwise—is typically 
procompetitive.9 The shift towards economically informed legal analysis 
profoundly affected the design of sector regulations, from transportation, 
to banking, to energy. As a result, most sectoral regulations banning 
vertical integration have fallen,10 as have other vertical restraints harmful 
to consumer welfare.11 
The recognition that vertical integration is typically procompetitive 
also required a significant course correction in antitrust law and policy. In 
the late 1970s, vertical mergers became more difficult to challenge.12 In 
1984, the DOJ revised its Merger Guidelines to recognize that vertical 
mergers “are less likely than horizontal mergers to create competitive 
problems.”13 As a result, the Agencies and the parties resolved almost all 
vertical merger concerns via consent agreements (“consents”),14 which 
 
 8 See, e.g., OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST 
IMPLICATIONS (1975); Roger D. Blair & David L. Kaserman, A Note on Bilateral Monopoly and Formula 
Price Contracts, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 460 (1987); Paul L. Joskow, The Role of Transaction Cost Economics 
in Antitrust and Public Utility Regulatory Policies, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53 (1991); Benjamin Klein, Robert 
G. Crawford & Armen A. Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contract-
ing Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297 (1978). 
 9 See infra Part I; see also Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol, The Rule of Reason and the Goals of 
Antitrust: An Economic Approach, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 471, 491 n.90 (2012) (noting that vertical integra-
tion through merger can lead to “increased competition”); Leah Brannon & Douglas H. Ginsburg, An-
titrust Decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, 1967 to 2007, 3 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 3, 12 (2007) (same); 
William E. Kovacic & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Policy: A Century of Economic and Legal Thinking, 14 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 43, 53 (2000) (same); D. Daniel Sokol, The Transformation of Vertical Restraints: Per Se 
Illegality, the Rule of Reason, and Per Se Legality, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 1003, 1006 (2014) (same). 
 10 See Wilson & Klovers, supra note 7, at 10–12. 
 11 See SAM PELTZMAN & CLIFFORD WINSTON, DEREGULATION OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES (2000) 
(describing the deregulation of various industries); Paul L. Joskow & Nancy L. Rose, The Effects of Eco-
nomic Regulation, in 2 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 1485 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert 
Willig eds., 1989) (explaining how the deregulation of the airline industry since 1978 has improved 
consumer welfare); Paul L. Joskow, Regulation and Deregulation After 25 Years: Lessons Learned for Re-
search in Industrial Organization, 26 REV. INDUS. ORG. 169, 169–70, 188–89 (2005) (outlining the dereg-
ulation in various industries that began in the 1970s). 
 12 See infra Part II. 
 13 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MERGER GUIDELINES 23 (1984), https://perma.cc/7WQF-ALW8. 
 14 See Steven C. Salop & Daniel P. Culley, Revising the US Vertical Merger Guidelines: Policy Issues 
and an Interim Guide for Practitioners, 4 J. ANTITRUST ENF’T 1, 25 & n.80, 28 & n.92 (2015). Some con-
sents may have been less effective. See Steven C. Salop, Invigorating Vertical Merger Enforcement, 127 
YALE L.J. 1962, 1976, 1992 (2018). Antitrust agencies should take care to craft effective consents. For 
remedying some of the limitations of existing consents, see, for example, Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, Antitrust Div., Justice Department Will Move to Significantly Modify and Extend Consent 
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ranged from the traditional to the quixotic,15 and in the handful of 
remaining cases, the parties abandoned the merger. Indeed, it took almost 
forty years for the Agencies to litigate another vertical merger challenge, 
United States v. AT&T Inc.,16 and to issue new Vertical Merger Guidelines. 
The Vertical Merger Guidelines acknowledge that “the agencies more 
often encounter problematic horizontal mergers than problematic 
vertical mergers”17 and describe an approach in which the Agencies will 
balance the tradeoff of procompetitive effects of EDM with the harms 
resulting from RRC. We call this the “unilateral effects tradeoff.”18 
Given this economic and legal history, the best way for antitrust law 
and policy to distinguish potentially anticompetitive vertical mergers 
from potentially procompetitive or competitively benign ones is not, as 
some populists have argued, to simply ban all such mergers.19 Rather, 
following the approach set out by the D.C. Circuit in AT&T, policymakers 
should create a series of presumptions, based on economic effects and a 
careful case-by-case analysis using existing empirical tools (and 
recalibrating those tools over time as economic learning advances),20 to 
assess the likely economic effects of a given vertical merger. Although “the 
lack of rules or even presumptions on vertical mergers” is untenable,21 it 
makes little sense to reflexively “readopt”22 bygone legal rules that were 
then, and even more surely are now, divorced from economic learning. 
 
Decree with Live Nation/Ticketmaster (Dec. 19, 2019), https://perma.cc/JB8P-GE2N; Press Release, 
Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Imposes Conditions on UnitedHealth Group’s Proposed Acquisition of 
DaVita Medical Group (June 19, 2019), https://perma.cc/DFJ5-DXRX; Press Release, Fed. Trade 
Comm’n, FTC Imposes Conditions on Northrop Grumman’s Acquisition of Solid Rocket Motor Sup-
plier Orbital ATK, Inc. (June 5, 2018), https://perma.cc/CE8G-TKAJ. 
 15 See, e.g., Christine S. Wilson & Keith Klovers, Yes We Can, But Should We?: Merger Remedies 
During the First Obama Administration, COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L ANTITRUST CHRONICLE 2 (Dec. 2014). 
 16 310 F. Supp. 3d 161 (D.D.C. 2018). 
 17 DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 3, at 2. 
 18 Id. at 4–5 (describing how the Agencies will evaluate the “net effect” of EDM and RRC). 
 19 For example, Professor Lina Khan argues that “[t]he best way to preserve fair and open com-
petition is . . . simply to completely ban any network monopolist from owning businesses that place it 
in competition with the companies that depend on it to reach [the] market . . . [which] is what previous 
generations did with railways.” Kevin Carty, Leah Douglas, Lina Khan & Matt Stoller, 6 Ideas to Rein in 
Silicon Valley, Open Up the Internet, and Make Tech Work for Everyone, N.Y. MAG.: INTELLIGENCER (Dec. 
11, 2017), https://perma.cc/XZ94-FS5H. 
 20 James Bernard, Rebecca Kirk Fair & D. Daniel Sokol, Why Does the Consumer Welfare Standard 
Work? Matching Methods to Markets, COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L ANTITRUST CHRON., Nov. 2019, at 1–7. 
 21 Open Markets Institute, American Economic Liberties Project, Frank Pasquale & Maurice 
Stucke, Comment Letter on Draft Vertical Merger Guidelines, at 16 (Feb. 10, 2020), 
https://perma.cc/CHC9-QWAE. 
 22 See id. at 1, 21–24 (urging readoption of the Department of Justice’s 1968 Merger Guidelines). 
  
2020] Analyzing Vertical Mergers 765 
Rather, policymakers should adopt and refine the burden-shifting 
framework set out in United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc.23 and first applied 
to vertical mergers in AT&T.24 Although this approach is generally 
accepted, the discussion today on burden shifting misses two critical 
refinements. First, because EDM and RRC are two sides of the same coin, 
if a plaintiff alleges an RRC theory of harm, then it should bear the burden 
(in step one) of demonstrating that the merger is likely to produce a net 
unilateral anticompetitive effect. Such an approach is consistent with the 
Vertical Merger Guidelines, which state that the Agencies will assess the 
“net effect” of all changes to a merged firm’s unilateral incentives.25 In 
litigation, this goal is achieved only if the analysis addresses both RRC and 
EDM; specifically, the plaintiff must show that the anticompetitive effect 
of RRC likely exceeds the procompetitive benefit of EDM in the instant 
case—the unilateral effects tradeoff. The same logic also likely applies to 
complete foreclosure, which is simply a more extreme form of RRC. This 
approach should guide both judicial review and agency enforcement. 
Second, if the plaintiff carries its burden at step one, then the 
defendant should be able to argue, and courts and Agencies should 
seriously consider, the full range of procompetitive efficiencies. As 
economists have long known, vertical integration can expand output by 
reducing transaction costs, better allocating risk, diffusing new 
technologies and techniques, reducing inventory costs, and better 
coordinating investment decisions. These efficiencies are real and should 
be credited when proven. Given the state of the literature on the efficacy 
of vertical contracting and the approach used in horizontal mergers, 
defendants in these cases should not bear the burden of demonstrating 
that every hypothetical alternative method of achieving these efficiencies 
is closed to them. That is, antitrust needs to embrace a “holistic efficiency 
analysis,” which incorporates this broader set of efficiencies that is well 
recognized in the academic literature. 
This Article is structured in three parts. Part I examines the economic 
literature, both theoretic and empirical. Part II reviews the legal history, 
starting with passage of the Clayton Act in 1914. Part III sets out the 
proposed legal framework that synthesizes the economics and the law. 
 
 23 908 F.2d 981, 991–92 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
 24 United States v. AT&T, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 161, 191 (D.D.C. 2018). 
 25 DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 3, at 5. 
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I. Economics of Vertical Mergers and Vertical Restraints 
Vertical integration refers to a firm’s decision to operate at two (or 
more) stages in the production and distribution of a product. For example, 
suppose that a downstream retail grocery chain owned an upstream dairy 
farm that produced raw milk,26 which it transferred to its retail outlets 
after processing. The chain would be vertically integrated from the 
production stage to the processing stage to the retail distribution stage. 
A merger integrating two firms along the same vertical chain 
incentivizes each formerly separate firm to account for the effect of its 
actions on its merging partner. For example, an unintegrated retailer’s 
profits may increase if a wholesaler decreases its price to that retailer. The 
same retailer’s profits may also increase if the wholesaler raises its price to 
the retailer’s competitors. Finally, the retailer’s price may affect the profit 
earned by the wholesaler via sales to other retailers, as consumers 
substitute across retailers based on price. Unintegrated firms ignore the 
effect of their actions on the profits of other firms; integrated firms 
optimally internalize how their actions affect their upstream and 
downstream affiliates. 
Horizontal merger enforcement is commonly premised on a single 
analogous change to a unilateral incentive.27 A firm can increase the profit 
of any other horizontally related firm by raising its price, thus diverting 
some of its demand to that firm. Unintegrated firms ignore this external 
effect, while integrated firms internalize the effect by increasing price to 
the detriment of consumers. Antitrust scrutiny of horizontal mergers 
often proceeds by measuring the effect of the unilateral incentive to 
increase price against that of productive efficiencies generated by the 
merger. 
In contrast, vertical mergers generate a more complex set of unilateral 
incentives, some of which typically benefit consumers and some of which 
typically harm consumers. The net effect of these incentives is ambiguous 
as a theoretical matter, meaning vertical mergers often benefit consumers 
even in the absence of productive efficiencies. Accounting for both 
 
 26 In discussing the distribution chain from the initial production stage to the final consumer, 
“downstream” refers to the move of goods towards the final consumer. Thus, when raw milk moves 
from a dairy farm to a milk processor, it is moving downstream. Movements “upstream” are the op-
posite, that is, these movements are further away from the final consumer. 
 27 Coordinated theories of harm also exist for horizontal mergers. See, e.g., Nathan H. Miller & 
Matthew C. Weinberg, Understanding the Price Effects of the MillerCoors Joint Venture, 85 
ECONOMETRICA 1763, 1788–89 (2017). However, the focus in merger enforcement since the 1992 Hor-
izontal Merger Guidelines has been on unilateral effects. 
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unilateral incentives and productive efficiencies, the empirical literature 
finds that vertical mergers usually benefit consumers. For example, 
Professors Francine Lafontaine and Margaret Slade survey the empirical 
literature and find that it “is highly supportive of the efficiency of vertical 
integration and mergers . . . [and] indicates that integration benefits 
consumers.”28 Two other surveys find similarly strong evidence that 
vertical integration generally benefits consumers.29 In United States v. 
AT&T, Inc., the district court was persuaded by evidence that three similar 
past vertical mergers did not result in price increases.30 
Determining prospectively whether a particular merger is likely to 
harm or benefit consumers necessarily involves a weighing of 
procompetitive and anticompetitive unilateral effects, even before 
accounting for productive efficiencies. Horizontal mergers have widely 
accepted indicia for likely unilateral harm.31 No such indicia exist for 
vertical mergers. Evidence that anticompetitive effects are likely to be 
large is unavailing if it is not analyzed concurrently with procompetitive 
effects.32 Thus, while neither economic theory nor empirical evidence rule 
out the possibility of harmful vertical mergers, both suggest that such 
 
 28 Francine Lafontaine & Margaret Slade, Vertical Integration and Firm Boundaries: The Evidence, 
45 J. ECON. LIT. 629, 675 (2007). 
 29 James C. Cooper, Luke M. Froeb, Dan O’Brien & Michael G. Vita, Vertical Antitrust Policy As a 
Problem of Inference, 23 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 639, 658 (2005) (“Most studies find evidence that vertical 
restraints/vertical integration are procompetitive . . . .”); Global Antitrust Institute, Comment Letter 
on the Federal Trade Commission’s Hearings on Competition and Consumer Protection in the 21st 
Century, at 6–7 (Sept. 6, 2018), https://perma.cc/SDG2-PM3A (finding that, of eleven papers written 
since 2008 identifying welfare implications of vertical integration, six found “positive welfare 
changes; four [found] no change, a mixed change, or no economically meaningful change . . . and only 
one (and perhaps two) had results that are consistent with a negative impact”). But see Marissa Beck & 
Fiona Scott Morton, Evaluating the Evidence on Vertical Mergers (Feb. 26, 2020) (unpublished com-
ment), https://perma.cc/GVZ6-X8NY (cautioning against strong inferences drawn from the vertical 
merger retrospectives surveyed by Lafontaine & Slade, Cooper et al., and the Global Antitrust Insti-
tute). 
 30 See United States v. AT&T, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 161, 215 (D.D.C. 2018). 
 31 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 20 
(2010) [hereinafter HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES], https://perma.cc/Q9HL-WNPV (“Unilateral 
price effects are greater, the more the buyers of products sold by one merging firm consider products 
sold by the other merging firm to be their next [best] choice.”). 
 32 See Gopal Das Varma & Martino De Stefano, Equilibrium Analysis of Vertical Mergers, 65 
ANTITRUST BULL. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 2–3), https://perma.cc/DHA9-WE8J (“[W]e show 
that RRC and EDM are not two separate effects. Instead, they are inseparably linked because the ex-
tent of EDM affects the strength of the RRC incentive, making EDM to be not just a stand-alone com-
petitive benefit to be weighed against RRC.”). 
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mergers may be difficult to distinguish from more common 
procompetitive vertical mergers, outside of special circumstances.33 
The remainder of this Section describes procompetitive effects 
(including productive efficiencies) and anticompetitive effects of vertical 
mergers in greater detail. It then discusses balancing the two effects and 
the types of evidence that might support an inference of harm. 
A. Procompetitive Effects of Vertical Integration 
This Section discusses both a procompetitive unilateral effect—the 
elimination of double marginalization—and procompetitive efficiencies. 
EDM is an inherent result of a vertical merger that must be analyzed 
concurrently with any anticompetitive unilateral effects. Some of the 
efficiencies that may result from vertical mergers have close analogues to 
those commonly resulting from horizontal mergers, while others may be 
unique to vertical merger analysis. The breadth and likelihood of 
productive efficiencies that may result from vertical mergers demands 
that efficiencies be given serious attention before reaching a conclusion 
that a vertical merger is likely to harm consumers. This Section addresses 
primarily the circumstance in which vertical integration is achieved by 
merger. 
1. Elimination of Double Marginalization 
The literature on EDM traces back to Professor Joseph J. Spengler, 
who recognized that upstream and downstream monopolists, operating 
independently, price inefficiently because they choose their own markups 
without reference to one another.34 When an upstream firm sells its 
output, it will maximize profits by setting price above its marginal cost, 
weighing the benefit of a higher margin against the reduction in demand 
caused by a higher price. A downstream firm treats the upstream firm’s 
price as part of its cost and imposes its own markup when it sells its own 
output, for the same reason the upstream firm charges a markup. In effect, 
there is a markup on a markup. 
A vertical merger incentivizes the combined firm to eliminate the 
double markup. Before merging, when the upstream firm sets its price, it 
ignores that a decrease in its price raises the downstream firm’s profit and 
instead maximizes only its own profit. After merging, the combined firm 
 
 33 See infra Section I.C.3. 
 34 See Joseph J. Spengler, Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy, 58 J. POL. ECON. 347, 349 (1950). 
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internalizes the effect of the upstream price on downstream profit and 
thus lowers the upstream price. 
Indeed, the integrated firm optimally will lower the upstream markup 
charged to the integrated downstream firm all the way to zero. Any 
internal transfer price paid from the downstream firm to the upstream 
firm neither increases nor decreases the combined firm’s overall profit. 
Instead, the transfer price lowers the profit of the downstream firm but 
increases the profit of the upstream firm by the same magnitude. Hence, 
the upstream firm optimally sets its internal price to the downstream firm 
to reflect the overall cost of the input to the firm.35 
Because it considers the impact of its choices on its affiliate, the 
merged firm earns a profit greater than the sum of the upstream and 
downstream profits of the unintegrated firms. This merger also benefits 
consumers: as the final good price falls, quantity rises, and both consumer 
welfare and total welfare increase. These results can be illustrated with a 





Suppose an upstream wholesale monopolist manufactures a product 
while an independently owned and operated downstream retail 
 
 35 External factors, such as the tax code, may affect these transfer prices. 
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monopolist sells the product at retail.36 In Figure 1, D represents the 
demand for the final product as sold by the retailer and MR is the 
associated marginal revenue. The marginal cost of performing the retail 
function is MCR. 
The retailer maximizes its profit by setting marginal revenue equal to 
marginal cost. For the retailer, its marginal cost is the sum of the marginal 
cost of retailing (“MCR”) and the wholesale price that the retailer pays to 
the wholesaler. Thus, profit maximization requires purchasing and selling 
that quantity where MR = MCR + w1. Rearranging the condition provides 
the wholesaler’s derived demand: w1 = MR – MCR, which is labeled  
d = MR – MCR in Figure 1. As one can see, d is parallel to MR; the vertical 
distance between MR and d is the marginal cost of retailing, MCR. The 
corresponding marginal revenue of d is mr. 
The wholesaler optimally will produce where its marginal revenue 
(“MR”) is equal to its marginal cost of production (“MCP”). The wholesale 
price (“w1”) is found on the derived demand d at the profit-maximizing 
quantity, which is Q1. Thus, the wholesaler produces Q1 and sells it to the 
retailer at a price of w1. Its profit is equal to (w1 – MCP)Q1. 
The retailer will maximize its profit by buying and reselling that 
quantity where its marginal revenue (“MR”) is equal to its marginal cost, 
which is w1 + MCR. As one can see in the figure, the profit maximizing 
quantity is Q1 and the corresponding price is P1. The retailer’s profit is  
(P1 – w1 – MCR)Q1. 
As both the wholesaler and retailer set a price above marginal cost, 
there is double marginalization. Were the wholesaler and retailer to 
vertically integrate, the combined firm would maximize its profit by 
equating the marginal revenue (“MR”) on sales of the final good to its total 
marginal cost of production and retailing (MCP + MCR). The profit 
maximizing quantity is Q2 and the corresponding price is P2. Thus, 
integration causes the retail price to fall from P1 to P2 and the quantity sold 
increases from Q1 to Q2. Under vertical integration, the combined firm sets 
a single markup over its combined cost of production and retailing, MCP + 
MCR. 
EDM results when the merged firm internalizes the negative pricing 
externality that its upstream price has on its downstream margin; 
therefore, EDM is likely to result from any vertical merger for which this 
type of externality exists. Consequently, this phenomenon will arise in any 
 
 36 EDM is illustrated using successive monopolists to abstract away from other unilateral effects 
that would result from a vertical merger of oligopolists. Our EDM analysis would extend to this case 
unaltered. 
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vertical merger in which the downstream firm is a current customer of the 
upstream firm and pays a markup over the upstream firm’s costs. It will 
also arise in vertical mergers involving a downstream firm that does not 
currently purchase from the upstream firm but would likely do so after 
integration. Indeed, EDM may even arise in vertical mergers in which the 
downstream firm is unlikely to purchase from the upstream firm after 
integration, if the merger would improve the bargaining position of the 
downstream firm when negotiating with its unintegrated supplier. 
Although EDM is a common phenomenon in vertical mergers, it is 
not always present. For example, EDM may not occur if the upstream 
firm’s product is technologically incompatible with the downstream firm’s 
needs. Similarly, if an already vertically integrated firm acquires an 
upstream rival, there may be no double margin to eliminate. Finally, if 
unintegrated firms have been able to completely eliminate double 
margins via contract, then their merger would, by definition, not result in 
EDM (although the mere possibility of achieving EDM via contract should 
not meaningfully alter analysis of EDM in any particular merger37). 
There is some debate about the frequency of the specialized 
circumstances described in the previous paragraph. For example, 
Professors Jonathan Baker, Nancy Rose, Steven Salop, and Fiona Scott 
Morton noted that “common assumptions that EDM merger benefits are 
inevitable . . . and that EDM can be presumed to be merger-specific” are 
not supported by economic reasoning.38 American Antitrust Institute 
President Diana Moss suggests “[t]here is a well-established case for 
caution regarding EDM, which is rooted in the restrictive assumptions 
underlying the theory.”39 
Contrary to these assertions, a vertical merger is likely to result in 
EDM if the cost to the upstream firm of supplying an input to the 
downstream firm (i.e., exclusive of markup) is less than the cost to the 
downstream firm of acquiring the same input from an unintegrated firm. 
Since an unintegrated firm typically will charge a markup above its costs, 
this condition will generally apply. While some types of contracts, such as 
two-part tariffs, can mitigate the double marginalization problem outside 
of vertical integration,40 there is no evidence that firms that have not 
already implemented such contracts are likely to be able to fully eliminate 
 
 37 See infra Section I.A.3. 
 38 Jonathan B. Baker, Nancy L. Rose, Steven C. Salop & Fiona Scott Morton, Comments Letter 
on the Draft Vertical Merger Guidelines, at 31 (Feb. 24, 2020), https://perma.cc/W9MN-X3W9. 
 39 American Antitrust Institute, Comment Letter on Draft Vertical Merger Guidelines, at 10 
(Feb. 25, 2020), https://perma.cc/LNQ6-8UX9. 
 40 See infra Section I.A.3. 
  
772 George Mason Law Review [Vol. 27:3 
the double margin by changing contracting practices.41 In fact, the 
empirical literature supports the contrary conclusion—namely, that 
vertical integration via contract is an imperfect substitute for vertical 
integration via merger.42 The Vertical Merger Guidelines endorse this 
perspective in noting that “[t]he Agencies do not, however, reject the 
merger specificity of the elimination of double marginalization solely 
because it could theoretically be achieved but for the merger.”43 
Most retrospective studies find that vertical integration benefitted 
consumers, and few show harmful effects.44 Merger retrospectives often 
measure the performance of merged firms against a set of similarly 
situated control firms. Such studies may be limited to observing the 
overall effects of a vertical merger on merging firms and may be unable to 
distinguish between various procompetitive and anticompetitive effects.45 
Nonetheless, the literature suggests that EDM is very likely to contribute 
significantly to the procompetitive effects of most vertical mergers.46 
 
 41 See Daniel P. O’Brien, The Antitrust Treatment of Vertical Restraints: Beyond the Possibility The-
orems, in SWEDISH COMPETITION AUTHORITY, THE PROS AND CONS OF VERTICAL RESTRAINTS 40, 63 
(2008) (“The use of nonlinear contracts can mitigate double-marginalization, but it does not neces-
sarily eliminate it.”). 
 42 See United States v. AT&T, Inc., 916 F.3d 1029, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (describing EDM likely to 
result from the merger); Gregory S. Crawford, Robin S. Lee, Michael D. Whinston & Ali Yurukoglu, 
The Welfare Effects of Vertical Integration in Multichannel Television Markets, 86 ECONOMETRICA 891, 
893–94 (2018) (finding substantial savings from integration in the cable industry); Lafontaine & Slade, 
supra note 28, at 649 (summarizing strong empirical support for inefficiencies associated with con-
tracting); see also discussion of the GM/Fisher merger infra Part III. 
 43 DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 3, at 12. 
 44 See Francine Lafontaine & Margaret Slade, Franchising and Exclusive Distribution: Adaptation 
and Antitrust, in II OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 387 (Roger D. Blair 
& D. Daniel Sokol eds., 2014) (providing a literature review); LaFontaine & Slade, supra note 28, at 677 
(“[O]verall a fairly clear empirical picture emerges. The data appear to be telling us that efficiency 
considerations overwhelm anticompetitive motives in most contexts. Furthermore, even when we 
limit attention to natural monopolies or tight oligopolies, the evidence of anticompetitive harm is not 
strong.”). 
 45 But see Fernando Luco & Guillermo Marshall, The Competitive Impact of Vertical Integration by 
Multiproduct Firms, 110 AM. ECON. REV. 2041, 2043 (2020) (measuring separately the effects of vertical 
integration on integrated and nonintegrated firms, finding unintegrated products increased in price 
by 1.2 to 1.5 percent, while prices for integrated products decreased by 0.8 to 1.2 percent). 
 46 See Cooper et al., supra note 29, at 648 (surveying twenty-two empirical papers, which “appear 
to provide strong support for the proposition that vertical integration/vertical restraints often help 
solve double markup problems”); Crawford et al., supra note 42, at 893–94 (describing an estimated 
structural model of the cable industry allowing a finding that “$0.79 of each dollar of profit realized 
by its integrated partner is internalized . . . when integrated MVPDs and RSNs bargain with each 
other” and that the overall effect of vertical integration, even in the absence of program access rules, 
“is to increase consumer and total welfare”); Panos Kouvelis, Drug Pricing for Competing 
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EDM benefits are likely to be largest when the upstream firm, prior 
to the merger, charges a large markup to the downstream firm it 
acquires.47 Benefits may be smaller if the merging firms already engage in 
some form of nonlinear contracting, or if the upstream firm is capacity 
constrained. 
In summary, unlike horizontal mergers, vertical mergers induce a 
procompetitive unilateral effect in addition to any such anticompetitive 
effects and in addition to procompetitive productive efficiencies. 
2. Efficiencies 
Often commentary on the procompetitive effects of vertical mergers 
focuses on EDM. Though EDM is important, there are many other 
potential procompetitive effects that should be considered. These 
efficiencies play a role in both vertical mergers and mergers of 
complementary or adjacent products.48 These efficiencies, while real both 
in terms of theory and empirics, often are not developed by the parties or 
credited by the Agencies. This “chicken and egg” problem hinders 
substantive development of efficiency arguments, both in litigation and 
during the Agencies’ merger review process.49 
 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Distributing Through a Common PBM, 27 PROD. OPER. MGMT. 3799 
(2018) (finding “when the price sensitivity of the PBM’s market size is sufficiently small, unless the 
vertical integration is associated with a sufficient increase in the market base, social welfare decreases 
after the integration due to the profit loss from the non‐integrated branded drug manufacturers. 
When the price sensitivity of the PBM’s market size is relatively large, the elimination of double mar-
ginalization benefits plan enrollees and significantly expands the PBM’s price‐driven market size, 
which leads to a higher social welfare in the post‐integration model”); Gunther Glenk & Stefan 
Reichelstein, Synergistic Value in Vertically Integrated Power‐to‐Gas Energy Systems, 29 PROD. OPER. 
MGMT. 526, 526–28 (2020) (identifying vertical integration effectiveness in electric energy); Ricard Gil, 
Does Vertical Integration Decrease Prices? Evidence from the Paramount Antitrust Case of 1948, 7 AMER. 
ECON. J. 162 (2015). On the limits of the assumptions on EDM see John Kwoka & Margaret Slade, Sec-
ond Thoughts on Double Marginalization, ANTITRUST MAG., Spring 2020, at 51; Jaideep Shenoy, An Ex-
amination of the Efficiency, Foreclosure, and Collusion Rationales for Vertical Takeovers, 58 MGMT SCI. 
1482, 1500 (2012) (“Collectively, our findings indicate that firms use corporate takeovers to expand 
their vertical boundaries consistent with an efficiency improvement rationale as predicted by the 
transaction cost economics and property rights theories.”). 
 47 See infra note 68 and accompanying text. 
 48 See, e.g., Annabelle Gawer & Rebecca Henderson, Platform Owner Entry and Innovation in 
Complementary Markets: Evidence from Intel, 16 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 1 (2007); Zhuoxin Li & 
Ashish Agarwal, Platform Integration and Demand Spillovers in Complementary Markets: Evidence from 
Facebook’s Integration of Instagram, 63 MGMT. SCI. 3438 (2017). 
 49 See Christine S. Wilson, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks on Breaking the Vicious Cy-
cle: Establishing a Gold Standard for Efficiencies at Bates White Antitrust Webinar (June 24, 2020), 
https://perma.cc/88HA-K25L. 
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a. Reduction of Transaction Costs 
Related to but distinct from EDM is the reduction of transaction costs 
through merger.50 Transaction costs explain why certain firms vertically 
integrate via merger rather than through contracts (markets).51 Nobel 
laureate Oliver Williamson defined a transaction as an event “when a good 
or service is transferred across a technologically separable interface. One 
stage of [processing or assembly] activity terminates and another begins.”52 
Thus, there is a choice of “make” or “buy” to reduce transaction costs.53 
The conditions under which transaction costs occur will vary with the 
particular governance mechanism used for a given transaction’s economic 
consequence.54 Those organizations that can reduce transaction costs are 
more likely to create more value for themselves. 
The theory that vertical integration may beneficially eliminate 
transaction costs first emerged in the 1970s, although its origins belong to 
Professor Ronald Coase.55 Empirical literature followed,56 as did literature 
 
 50 For EDM reviews outside of economics, see, for example, Gérard. P. Cachon & Patrick T. 
Harker, Competition and Outsourcing with Scale Economies, 48 MGMT. SCI. 1314 (2002). 
 51 See Mikko Ketokivi & Joseph T. Mahoney, Transaction Cost Economics As a Theory of Supply 
Chain Efficiency, 29 PROD. & OPERATIONS MGMT. 1011, 1011 (2020) (“TCE [is] one of the most cited and 
applied organization theories in operations and supply chain management research . . . .”); see also 
Andy A. Tsay, John V. Gray, In Joon Noh & Joseph T. Mahoney, A Review of Production and Operations 
Management Research on Outsourcing in Supply Chains: Implications for the Theory of the Firm, 27 PROD. 
& OPERATIONS MGMT. 1177, 1179–80 (2018). 
 52 Oliver E. Williamson, The Economics of Organization: The Transaction Cost Approach, 87 AM. 
J. SOC. 548, 552 (1981). 
 53 See Soon Ang & Detmar W. Straub, Production and Transaction Economies and IS Outsourcing: 
A Study of the U.S. Banking Industry, 22 MIS Q. 535, 537 (1998); Michael J. Leiblein & Douglas J. Miller, 
An Empirical Examination of Transaction and Firm-Level Influences on the Vertical Boundaries of the Firm, 
24 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 839, 848 (2003). Of course, a firm can pursue both strategies. See Anne Parmi-
giani, Why Do Firms Both Make and Buy? An Investigation of Concurrent Sourcing, 28 STRATEGIC MGMT. 
J. 285, 285 (2007). 
 54 See WILLIAMSON, supra note 8. 
 55 See Oliver E. Williamson, Vertical Integration, in 4 THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF 
ECONOMICS 807, 809 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1987) (“Although this [TCE] conception of the firm-as-
governance-structure was first advanced fifty years ago (Coase, 1937), it lacked operationality and lan-
guished for most of the next thirty-five years (Coase, 1972). The past fifteen years [1972–1987], by con-
trast, have witnessed renewed attention to and operational headway on transaction cost matters.”). 
See generally WILLIAMSON, supra note 8; R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937); 
Paul Joskow, Vertical Integration and Long-term Contracts: The Case of Coal-burning Electric Generating 
Plants, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 33 (1985); Klein et al., supra note 8; Oliver E. Williamson, The Vertical Inte-
gration of Production: Market Failure Considerations, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 112 (1971). 
 56 See, e.g., Jeffery T. Macher & Barak D. Richman, Transaction Cost Economics: An Assessment of 
Empirical Research in the Social Sciences, 10 BUS. & POL. 1 (2008); Scott E. Masten, Reaffirming 
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focused on antitrust-related issues.57 This literature identified that, under 
certain circumstances, vertical integration could eliminate transaction 
costs (particularly by addressing issues of specificity, uncertainty, and 
complexity) and thereby increase consumer welfare.58 
The premise behind the reduction of transaction costs through 
merger is that such integration is needed under a particular set of 
circumstances. Assume that assets are cospecialized. The more 
cospecialized the asset, the greater the need to have vertical integration. 
The more that a firm outsources cospecialized investments, the greater 
the likelihood of higher transaction costs due to holdup.59 The possibility 
of such holdup may be factored into the pricing of contracts across firms 
or may cause a vertical partner to be chilled from making cospecialized 
investments. In contrast, outsourcing is more likely when transaction 
costs are lower.60 
b. Reduction of Asymmetric Risk 
Vertical integration is a way to manage and mitigate risk, which may 
be asymmetric due to contractual incompleteness.61 Asymmetric risk also 
 
Relationship-Specific Investments: Comments on Miwa and Ramseyer’s ‘Rethinking Relationship-Specific 
Investments’, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2668, 2675 (2000) (“The empirical literature examining the determi-
nants of organizational form and contract design is extensive, certainly far too large to review here. 
Suffice it to say, surveys of the literature have all come to virtually the same conclusion, namely, that 
transaction-cost economics has been profoundly successful empirically.”); Howard A. Shelanski & Pe-
ter G. Klein, Empirical Research in Transaction Cost Economics: A Review and Assessment, 11 J. L. ECON. 
& ORG. 335 (1995). 
 57 See, e.g., Lafontaine & Slade, supra note 28; Alan J. Meese, Robert Bork’s Forgotten Role in the 
Transaction Cost Revolution, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 953, 960–61 (2014) (providing an overview). For an em-
pirical review, see infra note 227 (discussing the factors considered in determining vertical merger 
policy). 
 58 See Lafontaine & Slade, supra note 28, at 649 (summarizing literature on transaction costs 
models). 
 59 See Nicholas Argyres, Joseph T. Mahoney & Jackson Nickerson, Strategic Responses to Shocks: 
Comparative Adjustment Costs, Transaction Costs, and Opportunity Costs, 40 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 357, 
365 (2019). 
 60 There are of course hybrid organizational forms as well. See, e.g., Janet E.L. Bercovitz, The 
Option to Expand: The Use of Multi-Unit Opportunities to Support Self-Enforcing Agreements in Franchise 
Relationships, 1 ACAD. MGMT. PROC. Y1 (2002); Bryan Borys & David B. Jemison, Hybrid Arrangements 
As Strategic Alliances: Theoretical Issues in Organizational Combinations, 14 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 234, 235 
(1989). 
 61 See Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of 
Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691, 717 (1986); Oliver D. Hart & John Moore, Property 
Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1119, 1120 (1990). 
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impacts the possibility of holdup or contractual renegotiation.62 Due to 
the incompleteness of contracts, one party may be more risk averse with 
respect to contracting than the other. This risk is inherent in the supply 
chain process and is exacerbated by varying levels of ownership. Vertical 
integration by merger solves these asymmetric risk problems.63 
The risk uncertainty of a manufacturer may affect how it distributes 
its product downstream.64 The chosen options will differ based on a firm’s 
resources and strategy. Some firms may use distributors, an approach that 
creates various risks like principal-agent problems. Firms averse to these 
risks may want to mitigate them by vertically integrating forward. 
Financial vertical integration may improve a firm’s ability to achieve sales 
targets or to reap the rewards of promotional activities.65 Thus, 
downstream integration offers more control for a manufacturer over 
marketing practices, and increased control reduces uncertainty. 
c. Learning-by-Doing 
A knowledge‐based view of the firm, a view used in the management 
literature, stresses the role that knowledge plays in firm performance. 
Knowledge develops via learning-by-doing—an approach based on 
experiential learning within the firm.66 If used effectively, learning-by-
doing improves firm outcomes.67 Organizational design plays a role in 
 
 62 See George Baker, Robert Gibbons & Kevin J. Murphy, Informal Authority in Organizations, 15 
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 56, 59 (1999); Eric Maskin & John Moore, Implementation and Renegotiation, 66 REV. 
ECON. STUD. 39, 52 (1999); Ilya Segal & Michael D. Whinston, The Mirrlees Approach to Mechanism 
Design with Renegotiation (With Applications to Hold-Up and Risk Sharing), 70 ECONOMETRICA 1, 1 
(2002). 
 63 See René Aïd, Gilles Chemla, Arnaud Prochet & Nizar Touzi, Hedging and Vertical Integration 
in Electricity Markets, 57 MGMT. SCI. 1438, 1449–50 (2011) (discussing reduction of asymmetric risk). 
 64 See V. Kasturi Rangan, E. Raymond Corey & Frank Cespedes, Transaction Cost Theory: Infer-
ences from Clinical Field Research on Downstream Vertical Integration, 4 ORG. SCI. 454, 454 (1993) 
(“[C]hannel investments are influenced by a firm’s uncertainty absorption mechanism . . . .”). 
 65 See Wei Guan & Jakob Rehme, Vertical Integration in Supply Chains: Driving Forces and Conse-
quences for a Manufacturer’s Downstream Integration, 17 SUPPLY CHAIN MGMT. 187, 189 (2012); George 
John & Barton A. Weitz, Forward Integration into Distribution: An Empirical Test of Transaction Cost 
Analysis, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 337, 341 (1988). 
 66 See, e.g., LINDA ARGOTE, ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING: CREATING, RETAINING AND 
TRANSFERRING KNOWLEDGE 38 (2d ed. 2013); Olav Sorenson, Interdependence and Adaptability: Organ-
izational Learning and the Long-Term Effect of Integration, 49 MGMT. SCI. 446, 446 (2003) (discussing 
“learning by doing” based on asset specificity). 
 67 See Will Mitchell, J. Myles Shaver & Bernard Yeung, Foreign Entrant Survival and Foreign Market 
Share: Canadian Companies’ Experience in United States Medical Sector Markets, 15 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 
555, 565 (1994). 
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these outcomes. Firms with greater internal knowledge can benefit from 
greater vertical integration because of this increased knowledge.68 
The intuition is that the more specialized a firm becomes, the more 
constrained it is in its ability to coordinate effectively across different 
interdependent stages of production in a supply chain.69 In this context, 
something short of integration—like a joint venture that is vertical in 
nature70 or perhaps a strategic alliance—may be less efficient than vertical 
integration. In these settings, vertical integration is superior because 
extensive knowledge sharing and the coordination of interdependent 
tasks enabled by higher levels of internal knowledge enable the extraction 
of greater benefits.71 
d. Knowledge Transfers 
Vertical mergers also may generate efficiencies by facilitating the 
transfer of knowledge.72 Knowledge-based hierarchies are increasingly 
 
 68 See Rebecca Henderson & Ian Cockburn, Scale, Scope, and Spillovers: The Determinants of Re-
search Productivity in Drug Discovery, 27 RAND J. ECON. 32, 33 (1996); Jeffrey T. Macher & Christopher 
Boerner, Technological Development at the Boundaries of the Firm: A Knowledge‐Based Examination in 
Drug Development, 33 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1016, 1032 (2012) (“Holding firm experience constant, in-
sourcing fosters control and facilitates communication in ways that outsourcing has difficulty match-
ing.”); Jeffrey T. Macher, Technological Development and the Boundaries of the Firm: A Knowledge-Based 
Examination in Semiconductor Manufacturing, 52 MGMT. SCI. 826, 832 (2006). 
 69 See David J. Teece, Firm Organization, Industrial Structure, and Technological Innovation, 31 J. 
ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 193, 222 (1996) (identifying “firm organization . . . [as] an important determinant 
of innovation”). 
 70 See JOHN ALAN STUCKEY, VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND JOINT VENTURES IN THE ALUMINUM 
INDUSTRY 149 (1983) (explaining a joint venture consists of “two or more separate groups [that] jointly 
participate as co-owners of a producing organization” while “each joint venturer continues to exist as 
. . . independent of the joint-venture firm”). 
 71 See Rahul Kapoor, Persistence of Integration in the Face of Specialization: How Firms Navigated 
the Winds of Disintegration and Shaped the Architecture of the Semiconductor Industry, 24 ORG. SCI. 1195, 
1198 (2013). 
 72 See Fredrik Tell, Knowledge Integration and Innovation: A Survey of the Field, in KNOWLEDGE 
INTEGRATION AND INNOVATION: CRITICAL CHALLENGES FACING INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY-BASED 
FIRMS 20 (Christian Berggren et al. eds., 2011); Enghin Atalay, Ali Hortaçsu & Chad Syverson, Vertical 
Integration and Input Flows, 104 AM. ECON. REV. 1120, 1146 (2014); Robert M. Grant, Prospering in Dy-
namically-Competitive Environments: Organizational Capability as Knowledge Integration, 7 ORG. SCI. 
375, 380 (1996); Gabriel Natividad, Integration and Productivity: Satellite-Tracked Evidence, 60 MGMT. 
SCI. 1698, 1717 (2014); Zheng Jane Zhao & Jaideep Anand, A Multilevel Perspective on Knowledge Transfer: 
Evidence From the Chinese Automotive Industry, 30 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 959 (2009). 
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understood to add value to firms.73 A number of theoretical papers argue 
that hierarchies require the integration of knowledge to be effective.74 
Within an organizational setting, the firm must acquire, gather, and 
process information.75 This body of work suggests that an acquisition is 
valuable only if the acquirer can internalize and integrate the knowledge 
of the target.76 
The ability to direct knowledge transfer depends on both intensity 
and location of the knowledge transfer. Knowledge creation and transfer 
will work differently if outsourced outside the firm or if undertaken 
within the firm.77 Within the firm, knowledge transfer requires a different 
orientation, and it may be more difficult to replicate this set of 
relationships across organizations. 
e. Reduction of Information Leakage Due to the Use of Trade 
Secrets 
Firms may be unwilling to coordinate fully with upstream or 
downstream partners because of potential information leakage to 
competitors or would-be competitors. With vertical integration via 
merger, a firm need not be as concerned with information leakage and the 
 
 73 See Luis Garicano, Hierarchies and the Organization of Knowledge in Production, 108 J. POL. 
ECON. 874, 875–76 (2000); Raaj K. Sah & Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Quality of Managers in Centralized Versus 
Decentralized Organizations, 106 Q.J. ECON. 289, 289 (1991). 
 74 See, e.g., Yanhui Wu, Organizational Structure and Product Choice in Knowledge-Intensive Firms, 
61 MGMT. SCI. 1830 (2015). 
 75 See Masahiko Aoki, The Contingent Governance of Teams: Analysis of Institutional Complemen-
tarity, 35 INT’L ECON. REV. 657, 658–60 (1994); Patrick Bolton & Mathias Dewatripont, The Firm as a 
Communication Network, 109 Q.J. ECON. 809, 809 (1994); Garicano, supra note 73, at 874; Timothy Van 
Zandt, Real-Time Decentralized Information Processing as a Model of Organizations with Boundedly Ra-
tional Agents, 66 REV. ECON. STUD. 633, 633 (1999); Wu, supra note 74; Kevin Zheng Zhou & Caroline 
Bingxin Li, How Knowledge Affects Radical Innovation: Knowledge Base, Market Knowledge Acquisition, 
and Internal Knowledge Sharing, 33 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1090, 1092 (2012). 
 76 See Bruno Cassiman, Massimo G. Colombo, Paola Garrone & Reinhilde Veugelers, The Impact 
of M&A on the R&D Process: An Empirical Analysis of the Role of Technological- and Market-Relatedness, 
34 RES. POL’Y 195, 198 (2005); Marianna Makri, Michael A. Hitt & Peter J. Lane, Complementary Tech-
nologies, Knowledge Relatedness, and Invention Outcomes in High Technology Mergers and Acquisitions, 
31 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 602, 603 (2010). 
 77 See generally GEORGE VON KROGH, KAZUO ICHIJO & IKUJIRO NONAKA, ENABLING KNOWLEDGE 
CREATION: HOW TO UNLOCK THE MYSTERY OF TACIT KNOWLEDGE AND RELEASE THE POWER OF 
INNOVATION (2000); Riikka Mirja Sarala, Paulina Junni, Cary L. Cooper & Shlomo Yedidia Tarba, A 
Sociocultural Perspective on Knowledge Transfer in Mergers and Acquisitions, 42 J. MGMT. 1230 (2016); 
Henrik Bresman, Julian Birkinshaw & Robert Nobel, Knowledge Transfer in International Acquisitions, 
41 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 5 (2010). 
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loss of trade secrets. For this reason, vertical mergers may boost firm 
productivity with regard to critical high value products and processes.78 
f. Reducing Inventory Costs 
Inventory costs can be an important driver of total costs.79 Vertical 
integration may facilitate faster optimization and control over inventory,80 
and it also may reduce forecast bias.81 Empirical work suggests that vertical 
integration can improve operational performance through better 
inventory scheduling.82 Certainly some firms—like Walmart, Amazon, and 
Toyota—are very effective in creating complex supply chains for just-in-
time delivery. However, other firms are less effective at creating a lean 
supply chain system. For these other firms, the use of an internal transport 
hub for both production and logistics would make inventory scheduling 
easier.83 Indeed, internalization of the coordination functions may 
improve information flow or create efficiencies due to technological 
interdependencies in the production process.84 
Information sharing across firms in a supply chain may be valuable to 
reduce inventory costs and other related inefficiencies.85 However, 
effective sharing must include effective management and coordination 
across information technology (“IT”) infrastructures.86 The more difficult 
 
 78 See Sharon Novak & Scott Stern, Complementarity Among Vertical Integration Decisions: Evi-
dence from Automobile Product Development, 55 MGMT. SCI. 311, 312 (2009). 
 79 See Timothy F. Bresnahan & Peter C. Reiss, Dealer and Manufacturer Margins, 16 RAND J. 
ECON. 253, 264 (1985). 
 80 See Diane J. Reyniers, The Effect of Vertical Integration on Consumer Price in the Presence of In-
ventory Costs, 130 EUR. J. OPERATIONAL RES. 83, 88 (2001) (discussing how vertical integration may re-
duce inventory costs). 
 81 See Xiang Wan & Nadia R. Sanders, The Negative Impact of Product Variety: Forecast Bias, In-
ventory Levels, and the Role of Vertical Integration, 186 INT’L J. PROD. ECON. 123, 123–24 (2017). 
 82 See Hong Chen, Murray Z. Frank & Owen Q. Wu, What Actually Happened to the Inventories of 
American Companies Between 1981 and 2000?, 51 MGMT. SCI. 1015, 1015–17 (2005); John Stuckey & David 
White, When and When Not to Vertically Integrate, 34 SLOAN MGMT. REV. 71 (1993). 
 83 See Richard A. D’Aveni & David J. Ravenscraft, Economies of Integration versus Bureaucracy 
Costs: Does Vertical Integration Improve Performance?, 37 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1167, 1170 (1994). 
 84 See Abbie Griffin & John R. Hauser, Patterns of Communication Among Marketing, Engineering, 
and Manufacturing—A Comparison Between Two Product Teams, 38 MGMT. SCI. 360 (1992). 
 85 See Hau L. Lee, Kut C. So & Christopher S. Tang, The Value of Information Sharing in a Two-
Level Supply Chain, 46 MGMT. SCI. 626, 627 (2000). 
 86 See Henk Akkermans, Paul Bogerd, Enver Yücesan & Luk N. van Wassenhove, The Impact of 
ERP on Supply Chain Management: Exploratory Findings From a European Delphi Study, 146 EUR. J. 
OPERATIONAL RES. 284, 300 (2003); Eric K. Clemons & Bruce W. Weber, London’s Big Bang: A Case 
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it is to address disparate IT infrastructures, the more difficult it may be to 
achieve efficiencies in inventory management. These effects vary by firm 
IT due to the specific assets within a given firm. With the right set of 
assets, vertical integration—when a single firm has a more unified IT 
infrastructure—is efficient.87 Thus, the effective use of IT infrastructure 
within the same firm allows for reallocating excess IT-related capacity 
within other units of the firm to reduce inventory and other costs.88 
g. Research and Development and Innovation-Related Synergies 
One driver of vertical mergers may be research and development 
synergies. A series of finance papers suggests that complementary assets 
create efficiencies for merged firms.89 This literature is premised on the 
important underlying assumption that contractual integration short of a 
merger—through a strategic alliance, bilateral contracting, or corporate 
venture capital—is insufficient to achieve such efficiencies. 
The nature of knowledge transfer within a firm’s boundaries partly 
explains why acquisitions and contractual arrangements accomplish 
different results.90 For example, in a study on the pharmaceutical industry, 
internal knowledge coupled with external acquisition led to greater 
 
Study of Information Technology, Competitive Impact, and Organizational Change, 6 J. MGMT. INFO. SYS. 
41, 46–47 (1990). 
 87 See Gautam Ray, Ling Xue & Jay B. Barney, Impact of Information Technology Capital on Firm 
Scope and Performance: The Role of Asset Characteristics, 56 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1125, 1142 (2013) (noting 
that “in firms with narrowly valuable assets, the electronic brokerage effect of IT capital is likely to 
dominate, and IT capital is likely to facilitate more vertical and product-market specialization, in ways 
that are consistent with transaction cost economics; and in firms with broadly valuable assets, the 
electronic integration effect of IT capital is likely to dominate, and IT capital is likely to facilitate more 
vertical integration and product-market diversification, in ways that are consistent with the resource-
based view”). 
 88 See Hüseyin Tanriverdi, Performance Effects of Information Technology Synergies in Multibusi-
ness Firms, 30 MIS Q. 57, 58 (2006). 
 89 See Jan Bena & Kai Li, Corporate Innovations and Mergers and Acquisitions, 69 J. FIN. 1923, 1955 
(2014); Matthew J. Higgins & Daniel Rodriguez, The Outsourcing of R&D Through Acquisition in the 
Pharmaceutical Industry, 80 J. FIN. ECON. 351, 381 (2006); Gerard Hoberg & Gordon M. Phillips, Product 
Market Synergies and Competition in Mergers and Acquisitions: A Text-Based Analysis, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 
3773, 3808 (2010); Simi Kedia, S. Abraham Ravid & Vincente Pons, When Do Vertical Mergers Create 
Value?, 40 FIN. MGMT. 845, 872 (2011); Gordon M. Phillips & Alexei Zhdanov, R&D and the Incentives 
from Merger and Acquisition Activity, 26 REV. FIN. STUD. 34, 71–72 (2013). 
 90 See DAVID J. TEECE, DYNAMIC CAPABILITIES AND STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: ORGANIZING FOR 
INNOVATION AND GROWTH 171 (2009); Henry W. Chesbrough & David J. Teece, When Is Virtual Virtu-
ous? Organizing for Innovation, 74 HARV. BUS. REV. 65 (1996); David J. Teece, Gary Pisano & Amy Shuen, 
Dynamic Capabilities and Strategic Management, 18 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 509 (1997). 
  
2020] Analyzing Vertical Mergers 781 
consumer welfare.91 Similarly, technological relatedness creates increased 
efficiencies.92 
We recognize that not all mergers lead to the anticipated efficiencies. 
As one article summarizes: 
Building a new competitive capability via technology acquisitions is a multi-stage process 
in which the acquisition itself is simply the first step. Acquiring firms obtain valuable 
knowledge through acquisitions of target firms. Then, they must utilize the acquired 
knowledge for their subsequent services or products. Otherwise, the acquired knowledge 
is simply hoarded within the acquiring firms, and they fail to actualize the value of the 
acquired knowledge.93 
Overall, firm cultures differ, and the agility of startups is not always 
present in large firms. 
h. Investment Coordination 
Lack of information sharing creates the potential for a lack of 
coordination within a supply chain.94 Investment coordination within a 
firm is a way to solve this information problem and may justify vertical 
integration.95 Coordination risk stems from the fact that an individual 
firm’s decisions contribute to a collective vertical outcome. Because those 
 
 91 See John Hagedoorn & Ning Wang, Is There Complementarity or Substitutability Between Inter-
nal and External R&D Strategies?, 41 RES. POL’Y 1072, 1073 (2012) (“[I]nternal R&D and external R&D, 
through either R&D alliances or R&D acquisitions, are complementary innovation activities at higher 
levels of in-house R&D investments, whereas at lower levels of in-house R&D efforts, internal and 
external R&D turn out to be substitutive strategic options.”); Jaideep C. Prabhu, Rajesh K. Chandy & 
Mark E. Ellis, The Impact of Acquisitions on Innovation: Poison Pill, Placebo, or Tonic?, 69 J. MKTG. 114, 
126–27 (2005) (“Acquisitions provide a means to access external knowledge that can be difficult or 
even impossible to create through internal sources.”). But see Colleen Cunningham, Florian Ederer & 
Song Ma, Killer Acquisitions 1–3 (April 22, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://perma.cc/RUU8-
LH6N (identifying mechanisms by which mergers might kill off potential competitors in the pharma-
ceutical industry). 
 92 See Gautam Ahuja & Riitta Katila, Technological Acquisitions and the Innovation Performance of 
Acquiring Firms: A Longitudinal Study, 22 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 197, 215 (2001); Cassiman et al., supra 
note 76, at 213; Panos Desyllas & Alan Hughes, Do High Technology Acquirers Become More Innovative?, 
39 RES. POL’Y 1105, 1117 (2010); Joshua Sears & Glenn Hoetker, Technological Overlap, Technological 
Capabilities, and Resource Recombination in Technological Acquisitions, 35 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 48, 49–
51 (2014). 
 93 Seungho Choi & Gerry McNamara, Repeating a Familiar Pattern in a New Way: The Effect of 
Exploitation and Exploration on Knowledge Leverage Behaviors in Technology Acquisitions, 39 STRATEGIC 
MGMT. J. 356, 357 (2018). 
 94 See Chenyu Yang, Vertical Structure and Innovation: A Study of the SoC and Smartphone In-
dustries 1 (Sept. 1, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://perma.cc/E8QT-E52Z (studying vertical 
integration with chipset systems in smartphone industries). 
 95 See Robert Gibbons, Taking Coase Seriously, 44 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 145 (1999). 
  
782 George Mason Law Review [Vol. 27:3 
individual firms may employ different decisional rules, and because the 
choice of decisional rule is frequently opaque, supply chain instability may 
result. 
The classic business school “beer game”96—known in academic 
literature as the “bullwhip effect”97—exemplifies this phenomenon. The 
beer game explores how an entire supply chain (suppliers, manufacturers, 
and customers), purchasing agents, and marketing agents may have an 
incomplete view of actual demand for beer because of a lack of 
information. Each level within the supply chain can impact the entire 
supply chain if that level orders too much or too little beer. Thus, there is 
an interdependency of decision-making across each level of the vertical 
chain. Just so, intrafirm investment coordination may produce 
efficiencies because the agency costs of coordination within the firm may 
be reduced below the transaction costs of coordination across multiple 
actors in multiple firms.98 
3. Do Mergers and Contracts Produce the Same Benefits? 
Three contractual alternatives to complete integration by merger may 
yield some or all of the same economic benefits as vertical mergers when 
successfully implemented by unintegrated, vertically related firms.99 
First, maximum resale prices may, in certain circumstances, allow 
unintegrated firms to eliminate double marginalization via contract. If 
such a contract is possible, the upstream firm would optimally set a 
maximum resale price equal to the price a vertically integrated firm would 
 
 96 See, e.g., JAY W. FORRESTER, INDUSTRIAL DYNAMICS 357–58 (1961); Lisa Ellram, Introduction to 
the Forum on the Bullwhip Effect in the Current Economic Climate, 46 J. SUPPLY CHAIN MGMT. 3 (2010). 
 97 See, e.g., Rachel Crosen, Karen Donohue, Elena Katok & John Sterman, Order Stability in Supply 
Chains: Coordination Risk and the Role of Coordination Stock, 23 PROD. & OPERATIONS MGMT. 176 (2014); 
Ellram, supra note 96, at 3; Kimberly M. Thompson & Nima D. Badizadegan, Valuing Information in 
Complex Systems: An Integrated Analytical Approach to Achieve Optimal Performance in the Beer Distri-
bution Game, 3 IEEE ACCESS 2677, 2677–78 (2015). 
 98 See Crosen et al., supra note 97, at 194 (“[T]he notion of ‘optimal’ behavior is contingent on 
people’s assumptions about the thinking and behavior of the other agents with whom they interact. 
If a person believes that their counterparts will behave in an unpredictable and capricious fashion, 
this may lead to further instability in the supply chain.”). One may assume from these findings that it 
is easier through incentive alignment within a single firm, such as through financial rewards, than 
alignment across firms. 
 99 See Roger D. Blair & Amanda K. Esquibel, Maximum Resale Price Restraints in Franchising, 65 
ANTITRUST L.J. 157, 176–77 (1996); see also Roger D. Blair & David L. Kaserman, Optimal Franchising, 49 
S. ECON. J. 494 (1982); Roger D. Blair & David L. Kaserman, Uncertainty and the Incentive for Vertical 
Integration, 45 S. ECON. J. 266 (1978). 
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charge. At the same time, the upstream firm would compensate the 
downstream firm via lump-sum payment so that the downstream firm is 
no worse off than it would be absent the contract. Referring back to Figure 
1,100 a maximum resale price of P2 would achieve the benefits of EDM. The 
downstream retailer would then sell Q2 at P2. The upstream firm would 
earn a variable profit of (w1 – MCP)Q2, while the downstream firm would 
earn a variable profit of zero; the upstream firm’s profit can then be shared 
with the downstream firm via a lump-sum payment. The combined profit 
would equal the maximum profit that a vertically integrated firm could 
earn.101 
A second, closely related contractual alternative is a sales quota. The 
upstream firm can sell its output to the downstream firm at a price of w1 
on the condition that the downstream firm purchases at least Q2 units. 
Again, such a contract may require a lump-sum payment from the 
upstream firm to induce the downstream firm to agree to the contract. 
Referring again to Figure 1, the only way the downstream firm can sell Q2 
units is to set a price of P2. Under an optimal sales quota contract, the 
upstream firm’s variable profits would be (w1 – MCP)Q2, while the 
downstream firm would earn zero variable profit. 
A third and final contractual alternative is a two-part tariff. The 
upstream and downstream firms could agree to a contract in which the 
downstream firm pays a lump-sum license fee no greater than 
(P2 – MCR – MCP)Q2 in exchange for the right to purchase as many units as 
it would like from the upstream firm at a price equal to the upstream 
firm’s marginal cost, MCP. 
Maximum resale prices, sales quotas, and two-part tariffs partially 
replicate EDM’s effects to the benefit of consumers. Hence, when any such 
contract is observed between two unintegrated firms, it is very likely to be 
efficient. Importantly, the inverse—that a lack of such contracting implies 
the inefficiency of vertical integration—is false. In practice, the obstacles 
that confront two unintegrated firms seeking to reach agreement on such 
a contract may often be significant.102 To take just one example, optimal 
implementation of a maximum resale price arrangement would require 
 
 100 Supra Section I.A.1. 
 101 The integrated firm’s profit is (P2 – MCR – MCP)Q2 while the unintegrated firms’ profits sum 
to (w1 – MCP)Q2. Since P2 = w1 + MCR, these profits are identical. Of course, prior to State Oil Co. v. 
Kahn, 522 U.S. 3 (1997), maximum resale prices were per se illegal under Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 
U.S. 145 (1968). 
 102 See Gregory J. Werden & Luke M. Froeb, Comment Letter on Proposed Vertical Merger Guide-
lines 1 (Feb. 6, 2020), https://perma.cc/PW2P-5VNA (“[I]t is essential to appreciate that vertical mer-
gers solve coordination problems that are solved less well, or not at all, by contracts.”). 
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full knowledge of both the demand curve for the final good and both 
firms’ cost curves to set the maximum price. Any antitrust practitioner 
knows how difficult it is to project costs and demand across a range of 
counterfactual scenarios, as would be required for complete contracting. 
Thus, it is likely that for many unintegrated firms, efficient contracting is 
either impossible or prohibitively costly. 
Instead, some commentators seem to embrace the idea that a lack of 
contracting indicates that there is no conceivable gain to greater 
integration. For instance, Professors Baker, Rose, Salop, and Scott Morton 
state that “[i]f in advance of the merger the parties never considered 
contracting to eliminate double marginalization, that fact may suggest 
that EDM would not achieve substantial benefits.”103 This suggestion 
overlooks innocuous explanations for lack of premerger contracting, 
including insurmountable information asymmetries or contracting costs. 
In contrast, EDM is not difficult for a fully vertically integrated firm to 
realize: all that is required is for the upstream firm to sell its output to the 
downstream firm at cost. 
Putting aside the minor question of how firms could possibly 
demonstrate the impossibility of achieving a certain type of contract, 
there appears to be no basis for an inference that because certain types of 
contracts are theoretically possible, EDM generated by merger is 
irrelevant.104 
In summary, while there is convincing theoretical and empirical 
evidence that vertical contracts can efficiently eliminate double 
marginalization, the inverse argument—that the absence of those 
contracts implies they are inefficient—is wrong. An alternative—and 
more likely—explanation for the inability to achieve EDM via contract is 
that implementing those contracts is difficult (e.g., because of 
informational asymmetries and contracting costs). Fortunately, the 
Vertical Merger Guidelines broadly endorse the merger specificity of EDM 
in saying that existing, premerger contracts are generally the appropriate 
baseline against which EDM must be measured.105 
 
 103 Baker et al., supra note 4, at 15. 
 104 To do so would apply an even more stringent standard for merger specificity than the Hori-
zontal Merger Guidelines, which state “[o]nly alternatives that are practical in the business situation 
faced by the merging firms are considered in making this determination [of merger specificity]. The 
Agencies do not insist upon a less restrictive alternative that is merely theoretical.” HORIZONTAL 
MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 31, at 30. 
 105 See DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 3, at 11–12. 
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B. Anticompetitive Effects of Vertical Integration 
The previous Section discussed how vertical mergers spur the merged 
firm to internalize a pricing externality, resulting in EDM. This Section 
discusses a related pricing externality: a higher price charged by the 
upstream firm to unintegrated downstream firms increases the profit of 
the integrated downstream firm. Once again, the upstream firm ignores 
this externality before merging, and it optimally accounts for it after 
merging. This incentive change creates the potential for anticompetitive 
effects to arise from vertical mergers. Potential anticompetitive effects 
include complete foreclosure, theories of two-level entry, and access to 
competitively sensitive information. 
1. Raising Rivals’ Costs 
If an upstream firm sells to multiple downstream firms, then its 
pricing to any particular downstream firm affects the profits of each other 
downstream firm. Consider an upstream firm U selling to downstream 
firms D1 and D2. Were U to increase the price it charges to D2, then D2 
would optimally increase its final good price, causing it to lose 
customers.106 If at least some of these lost customers switch to D1, then D1 
will be more profitable than it was prior to U increasing the price it 
charged to D2.107 
When U and D1 are separately owned, U ignores the effect of its prices 
on D1’s profit, while a merger of U and D1 spurs U to internalize the effect 
of its price to D2 on the profits of D1. The result—higher prices to 
unintegrated downstream rivals—is often referred to as raising rivals’ 
costs (“RRC”). Analysis of the RRC pricing externality is often associated 
 
 106 The effect of input prices on a firm’s optimal output price is well-studied in the economics 
literature. See, e.g., Sonia Jaffe & E. Glen Weyl, The First-Order Approach to Merger Analysis, 5 AM. ECON. 
J.: MICROECONOMICS 188 (2013) (developing a first order approximation of how upward pricing pres-
sure generated by a horizontal merger is passed through to price); Nathan H. Miller, Marc Remer, 
Conor Ryan & Gloria Sheu, Upward Pricing Pressure as a Predictor of Merger Price Effects, 52 INT’L J. 
INDUS. ORG. 216 (2017) (finding that an own pass-through of one and cross pass-through of zero may 
reasonably approximate pass-through of incentives generated by horizontal mergers). 
 107 To see this, note that D1 could increase its price until it had the same demand as it did prior 
to D2’s price increase, so that it would sell the same quantity at a greater margin. Of course, a smaller 
price increase may be even more profitable for D1. 
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with Professor Steven Salop, who, along with coauthors, developed the 
foundations for RRC theories of harm in the 1980s.108 
The particular mechanism through which a vertical merger may 
result in RRC depends on the nature of the interactions between upstream 
and downstream firms. For example, business-to-business transactions 
are commonly conducted via bargaining in which both sides attempt to 
reach a mutually agreeable price (e.g., by exchanging offers). Naturally, the 
party that has less to lose from a breakdown in negotiations may be in a 
stronger bargaining position and thus able to demand more concessions 
from the party that has more to lose from a breakdown. As Professor 
William Rogerson explains, a vertical merger in this setting may result in 
RRC because it “affects the disagreement payoff of the upstream firm 
when it negotiates with a rival downstream firm. Its disagreement payoff 
is increased because it takes into account the extra profit that its own 
downstream affiliate will earn” in the event of a bargaining breakdown.109 
Bargaining models have been prominent in antitrust analyses of 
several recent vertical mergers between upstream video content providers 
and downstream multichannel video programming distributors 
(“MVPDs”).110 In AT&T, the DOJ contended that owning AT&T’s DirecTV 
service would increase Time Warner’s bargaining leverage in negotiations 
for its content with unintegrated MVPDs, as “[t]he alternative to an 
agreement in every negotiation with a rival MVPD would be better for the 
merged firm because without a deal, DirecTV would steal valuable video 
subscribers away from that rival.”111 In the DOJ’s view, this additional 
bargaining power would enable Time Warner to extract higher 
programming fees from unintegrated MVPDs, ultimately resulting in 
higher prices to consumers. 
The Court found various flaws in the DOJ’s RRC theory of harm. 
These flaws included unrebutted findings that similar past vertical 
mergers did not result in price increases, disbelief that the improvement 
to AT&T’s bargaining leverage would be substantial, failure to account for 
AT&T’s long-term contract offers, and poor quality inputs to the DOJ’s 
 
 108 See, e.g., Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals’ 
Costs to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209 (1986); Steven C. Salop & David T. Scheffman, Raising 
Rivals’ Costs, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 267 (1983). 
 109 William P. Rogerson, Modelling and Predicting the Competitive Effects of Vertical Mergers: The 
Bargaining Leverage Over Rivals (BLR) Effect, 53 CANADIAN J. ECON. 407, 409 (2020). 
 110 Id. at 410–11. 
 111 Post-Trial Brief of the United States at 1, United States v. AT&T Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 161 (D.D.C. 
2018). 
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expert’s model.112 Similar bargaining models have been successfully 
employed by the Agencies in horizontal health care mergers.113 
RRC effects are likely to be of greatest concern when the merged firm 
has unintegrated downstream customers and when these customers sell 
products that are close substitutes for the merged firm’s own downstream 
product and have limited comparable alternatives to purchasing inputs 
from the merged firm. Absent these conditions, concerns about potential 
RRC effects are appropriately diminished. 
2. Foreclosure 
Early vertical merger enforcement was often premised on the concern 
that the merged firm would not buy or sell from unintegrated firms and 
that this practice was facially anticompetitive.114 To take but one example, 
the Sixth Circuit upheld the FTC’s administrative blocking of a vertical 
merger between a cement manufacturer and a ready mix concrete firm in 
part because the merger would have increased the fraction of 
northeastern US cement demand derived from vertically integrated 
concrete companies from 39.6% to 46.3%, which the FTC and the Sixth 
Circuit deemed “extremely significant” and “anti-competitive.”115 In the 
court’s view, “[t]he important consideration is that the acquired company 
would not be free to choose for itself who shall supply its needs solely on 
the basis of price, service and quality of goods because the acquiring 
company has the power to substitute its own suppliers.”116 The court—and 
contemporary practitioners—referred to the putative closing of a 
vertically integrated firm to unintegrated competitors as “foreclosure.”117 
 
 112 See AT&T, 310 F. Supp. 3d at 216 (endorsing defendants’ findings that three prior vertical trans-
actions did not lead to price increases); id. at 224 (“[T]he lynchpin of Professor Shapiro’s testimony . . . 
is the assumption that a post-merger Turner would gain increased leverage by wielding a blackout 
threat that will be only somewhat less incredible.”); id. at 226 (“I agree with defendants, for the most 
part, that the inputs and assumptions of Professor’s Shapiro’s model are not sufficiently grounded in 
the evidence . . . .”); id. at 239–40 (summarizing long-term contract offers). 
 113 See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.–Namps, Inc. v. St. 
Luke’s Health Sys., No. 1:12-CV-00560-BLW, 2013 WL 5410057, at *19 (D. Idaho Sept. 25, 2013) (“The 
Acquisition will increase substantially St. Luke’s bargaining leverage with health plans.”). 
 114 For a full discussion, see infra Section II.B. 
 115 U.S. Steel Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 426 F.2d 592, 601 (6th Cir. 1970). 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. Some texts distinguish between input foreclosure, or declining to sell to unintegrated 
downstream firms, and customer foreclosure, or declining to buy from unintegrated upstream firms. 
This Section addresses both. 
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The logic of foreclosure as an antitrust theory of harm in these early 
vertical cases often rested on two assumptions: first, that vertical 
integration precludes dealings with unintegrated firms, and second, that 
the result of two vertically related firms dealing exclusively with each 
other is necessarily anticompetitive. There is little support for either 
assumption. 
First, as a general matter, vertical integration does not incentivize a 
firm to eliminate sales to or purchases from unintegrated firms. Profit-
maximizing firms, regardless of whether they are vertically integrated, will 
sell to unintegrated rivals if the price paid by those rivals exceeds marginal 
cost and will purchase inputs from unintegrated rivals if the cost is lower 
than that of alternatives, including self-supply.118 Empirically, Professors 
Enghin Atalay, Ali Hortaçsu, and Chad Syverson find that within the set 
of vertically integrated firms, only 1.2% of upstream establishments ship 
exclusively to downstream establishments within the same firm.119 Indeed, 
they find that roughly half of these establishments do not ship to 
integrated downstream units at all, and “[e]ven the ninetieth percentile 
establishment ships over 60 percent of its output outside the firm.”120 In a 
separate paper, Hortaçsu and Syverson study a wave of vertical integration 
between cement plants and ready mix concrete plants and find lower 
prices and greater output following the merger wave, which they 
characterize as “not consistent with foreclosure.”121 
Of course, vertical mergers may incentivize the merged firm to offer 
less favorable terms to unintegrated rivals.122 As a theoretical matter, it is 
possible that RRC incentives could be so great as to rule out sales to or 
purchases from unintegrated firms altogether and thus to result in total 
foreclosure. It is also possible that certain firms may face a meaningful all-
or-nothing decision about whether to supply unintegrated rivals. For 
example, Professors Jeffrey Church and Neil Gandal suggest that vertical 
integration between hardware and software providers may meaningfully 
 
 118 See, e.g., David Reiffen & Michael Vita, Comment: Is There New Thinking on Vertical Mergers?, 
63 ANTITRUST L.J. 917, 918 (1995) (“The integrated firm will sell the input to nonintegrated firms down-
stream if the ‘open’ market price exceeds the integrated firm’s marginal cost of producing the input; 
it will buy the input from nonintegrated input suppliers if the market price is less than its marginal 
cost of producing the input.”). 
 119 See Enghin Atalay, Ali Hortaçsu & Chad Syverson, Vertical Integration and Input Flows, 104 AM. 
ECON. REV. 1120, 1127 (2014) (Table 1, column headed “Fraction = 1”). 
 120 Id. 
 121 Ali Hortaçsu & Chad Syverson, Cementing Relationships: Vertical Integration, Foreclosure, 
Productivity, and Prices, 115 J. POL. ECON. 250, 262 (2007) (finding that vertical integration is empirically 
associated with lower concrete prices). 
 122 See supra Section I.B.1. 
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alter incentives to make software compatible with rivals’ hardware as the 
software maker internalizes the effect of compatibility on the hardware 
maker’s profits.123 If the incompatibility decision would not be easily 
reversible, then a focus on whether (total) foreclosure would result from 
such a merger may be appropriate. However, whether foreclosure is 
contemplated as the result of a large RRC incentive or as the result of an 
all-or-nothing compatibility decision, a conclusion that foreclosure is 
likely should only be reached after careful factual scrutiny. In particular, 
given available empirical results suggesting that vertically integrated firms 
rarely forego interacting with unintegrated rivals,124 foreclosure should 
not be assumed as an inevitable consequence of vertical integration. Even 
a determination that foreclosure would be more profitable than the status 
quo for the merging firms is insufficient to support a foreclosure theory if 
the alternative of continuing to sell to unintegrated rivals at higher prices 
remains most profitable. If this alternative is ignored in formulating a 
foreclosure theory, competitive harms may be overstated relative to an 
RRC theory, under which the merged firm would continue to sell to rivals. 
Second, courts adjudicating early vertical cases seemed to treat 
foreclosure as self-evidently anticompetitive. For example, in Brown Shoe 
Co. v. United States,125 the Court viewed foreclosure as the “primary vice of 
a vertical merger,” because “the arrangement may act as a ‘clog on 
competition’” by preventing rivals from competing for the business of the 
vertically integrated firm.126 But a firm would withdraw from the open 
market only if it earned a higher profit from dealing exclusively with its 
vertically integrated counterpart than it would from any nonintegrated 
firm. True foreclosure, then, benefits both the foreclosing firm and its 
customers.127 Whether customers of the remaining firms are harmed at 
all—much less to an extent that would cancel out the benefits accruing to 
customers of the foreclosing firm—necessarily requires fact finding and 
 
 123 See Jeffrey Church & Neil Gandal, Systems Competition, Vertical Merger, and Foreclosure, 9 J. 
ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 25, 29 (2000) (“[F]oreclosure will be a credible threat if the fixed costs of 
eliminating compatibility, i.e., of foreclosure, are relatively small and the costs of reestablishing com-
patibility are relatively large (which is typically the case).”). 
 124 See supra note 35. 
 125 370 U.S. 294 (1962). 
 126 Id. at 323–24 (quoting Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 314 (1949)). 
 127 The mechanism through which the foreclosing firm would find it optimal to withdraw from 
the open market is the elimination of double marginalization, which benefits consumers as well as 
vertically integrated firms. See supra Section I.A.1 for a full discussion. 
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empirical analyses.128 Indeed, in The Antitrust Paradox, Judge Robert Bork 
observed that a vertical merger may largely rearrange supplier-customer 
relationships with no real harm done.129 While foreclosure resulting from 
vertical integration may, in certain circumstances, result in consumer 
harm, plaintiffs must bear the burden of explaining why a given merger 
falls into those circumstances; courts should not view consumer harm as 
an inexorable consequence of foreclosure. 
While the Agencies have not fully litigated a merger under a 
foreclosure theory since 1977,130 concerns about foreclosure appear to have 
formed the basis for several consents131 and one recent private lawsuit.132 
Foreclosure appears prominently in the Vertical Merger Guidelines,133 
albeit alongside RRC. Although the economic literature has increasingly 
viewed foreclosure as a special case of RRC,134 there are exceptions. To take 
one example, the influential paper of Professors Janusz Ordover, Garth 
Saloner, and Steven Salop models equilibrium foreclosure resulting from 
a vertical merger. They abstract from EDM by modelling perfect 
competition upstream to find that vertical foreclosure is often a profitable 
strategy for merging firms, resulting in higher prices and lower consumer 
welfare.135 Importantly, the Ordover, Saloner, and Salop paper and other 
related papers assume that vertically integrated firms have the ability to 
commit to not selling to unintegrated firms, even if they could profitably 
do so because the price those firms would be willing to pay exceeds the 
integrated firm’s marginal cost of production. Absent the ability to 
 
 128 See Michael A. Salinger, Vertical Mergers and Market Foreclosure, 103 Q.J. ECON. 345, 355 (1988) 
(describing tradeoff between unintegrated producers having lower demand—resulting in lower 
prices—and higher concentration among these producers—resulting in higher prices— and conclud-
ing that “[a] vertical merger does not, therefore, necessarily result in market foreclosure of unin-
tegrated producers”). 
 129 See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 232 (1978). 
 130 See United States v. Hammermill Paper Co., 429 F. Supp. 1271 (W.D. Pa. 1977). 
 131 See generally Steven C. Salop & Daniel P. Culley, Vertical Merger Enforcement Actions: 1994–
April 2020 (Apr. 15, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://perma.cc/UUW8-HZED (summarizing 
sixty-six enforcement actions relating to vertical concerns). 
 132 See Steves & Sons, Inc. v. Jeld-Wen, Inc., 345 F. Supp. 3d 614, 682 (E.D. Va. 2018) (ordering 
equitable remedies to cure an instance of input foreclosure), appeal dismissed, Case No. 19-2466, 2020 
WL 3422366 (4th Cir. June 8, 2020). 
 133 See DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 3, at 4. 
 134 See, e.g., Baker et al., supra note 4, at 13 (“‘Foreclosure’ is broadly defined. For example, input 
foreclosure includes price increases, cost increases, and other disadvantages placed on downstream 
rivals, not just total denial of the relevant input.”). 
 135 See, e.g., Janusz A. Ordover, Garth Saloner & Steven C. Salop, Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure, 
80 AM. ECON. REV. 127, 136 (1990). 
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commit to forego profitable sales, vertical integration need not result in 
foreclosure at all. As economist David Reiffen puts it, since the Ordover, 
Saloner, and Salop result hinges on commitment—and not vertical 
integration per se—“it is difficult to see how the [Ordover, Saloner, and 
Salop] results are related to vertical integration at all.”136 
While there are papers with foreclosure models that avoid Dr. 
Reiffen’s criticism,137 no generally accepted approach to modelling 
foreclosure is available that can reliably “distinguish harmful from 
beneficial vertical mergers,” as Professor Michael Salinger suggested 
would be required for a rule of reason in a 1988 paper on foreclosure.138 
3. Two-Level Entry 
Two-level entry refers to a theory that the presence of a vertically 
integrated firm in markets A and B may make entry into either market A 
or market B more difficult (e.g., the vertically integrated firm will decline 
to sell to or buy from a new entrant). Historically, two-level entry was a 
common theory of harm in vertical merger cases, and it received 
substantial discussion in the 1984 Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines.139 
Two-level entry may also be used to consider vertical contracts—such as 
exclusive dealing—as a barrier to entry for the upstream market.140 In the 
example of Brown Shoe, Brown’s exclusive dealing contracts with shoe 
stores could create a second barrier to entry for rival shoe manufacturers 
because entry would need to occur at two levels rather than a single 
level.141 This theory has faded from prominence, which Professors Phillip 
Areeda and Herbert Hovenkamp ascribe to a recognition that two-level 
entry barriers are rarely significant.142 The Vertical Merger Guidelines 
contain one example considering two-level entry, which states that the 
Agencies would weigh foreclosure of potential entrants against the 




 136 David Reiffen, Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure: Comment, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 694, 694 (1992). 
 137 See, e.g., Church & Gandal, supra note 123. 
 138 Salinger, supra note 128, at 355. 
 139 See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 13, at 23–24. 
 140 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST 
PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 1802e (4th ed. 2018). 
 141 See Brown Shoe Co., Inc. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 302–03 (1962). 
 142 See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 140, ¶ 1802e. 
 143 See DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 3, at 4. 
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4. Misuse of Competitively Sensitive Information and Coordinated 
Effects 
In some circumstances, vertical integration may give one firm access 
to sensitive information of the other firm’s trading partners. If there is 
competitive overlap between one half of a vertically integrated pair of 
firms and the other half’s trading partners, a merger may allow one firm 
to access and act upon sensitive information about its competitors in a 
way that harms competition. In the 2018 merger of Staples and Essendant, 
this concern about harming competition prompted the FTC to require 
Staples to firewall competitively sensitive information about Essendant’s 
retailer customers.144 
The Agencies sometimes view the greater transparency created by 
accessing a vertical partner’s competitive intelligence as a potential 
facilitator to coordination across horizontal competitors. For example, in 
the 2017 merger of Danone (yogurt) and WhiteWave (milk), the DOJ 
feared that Danone’s prior commercial partnership with a competing milk 
manufacturer, CROPP, would facilitate post-merger collusion between 
WhiteWave and CROPP.145 The DOJ ordered Danone to divest its 
Stonyfield brand, which severed the relationship between Danone and 
CROPP.146 
C. Balancing Procompetitive and Anticompetitive Effects of Vertical 
Integration 
A vertical merger typically produces both procompetitive (e.g., EDM) 
and anticompetitive (e.g., RRC) unilateral effects in addition to 
efficiencies. In contrast, a problematic horizontal merger is likely to 
produce only harmful unilateral effects (e.g., upward pricing pressure) in 
addition to efficiencies. 
In horizontal enforcement, the Agencies commonly assess the extent 
to which one merging firm constrains the other. If the Agencies determine 
that the merging firms’ competitive overlap is significant, they may 
independently analyze any efficiency claims the parties present. Both as a 
 
 144 See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Imposes Conditions on Staples’ Acquisition of 
Office Supply Wholesaler Essendant Inc. (Jan. 28, 2019), https://perma.cc/V2VH-D49R. 
 145 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Div., Justice Department Requires Divesti-
ture of Danone’s Stonyfield Farms Business in Order for Danone to Proceed with WhiteWave Acqui-
sition (Apr. 3, 2017), https://perma.cc/BD5N-BE3H. 
 146 See id. 
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matter of practice and as a matter of law,147 these assessments are separate: 
plaintiffs are responsible for harms and defendants are responsible for 
efficiencies. Literature148 and our combined experience149 suggest that 
efficiencies evidence rarely suffices to overcome an agency determination 
that the merging firms would, in combination, create likely 
anticompetitive effects. Thus, to a large extent, the Agencies attempt to 
block a merger upon a finding that it will likely produce harm. 
Whatever the merits of the Agencies’ approach to horizontal mergers, 
an analogous approach to vertical enforcement is indefensible. The same 
forces that could give rise to harm in vertical mergers also produce 
consumer benefits. Both EDM and RRC result from the merged firm’s 
internalization of pricing externalities.150 Moreover, the forces that are 
posited to give rise to harmful RRC effects are closely related to those that 
produce beneficial EDM effects, meaning that a determination that 
significant RRC is likely should lead one to suspect that significant EDM 
is likely as well. Consequently, EDM and RRC must be analyzed 
concurrently, and a determination that a vertical merger is likely to result 
in RRC or foreclosure is unavailing without a concurrent analysis of EDM 
effects. 
For ease of exposition, this Section is confined to the discussion of 
RRC and not total foreclosure (which, in many cases, is essentially an 
extreme case of RRC). However, the Section applies with equal force to 
foreclosure theories of harm, which should not be analyzed independently 
of EDM for the same reasons. 
1. EDM Is a Determinant of RRC 
As a theoretical matter, it is not possible to determine the magnitude 
of a firm’s RRC incentive without knowledge of its EDM incentive. As 
economists Gopal Das Varma and Martino De Stefano explain in a recent 
 
 147 See infra Section II.C (discussing the Baker Hughes burden-shifting framework). 
 148 See Malcolm B. Coate & Andrew J. Heimert, Merger Efficiencies at the Federal Trade Com-
mission 1997-2007, at 3, 16–18 (2009) (unpublished manuscript), https://perma.cc/WRT2-FAWY 
(summarizing data collected from internal FTC memos written between 1997 and 2007 demonstrat-
ing that Bureau of Competition staff accepted 29 of 342 efficiency claims, and accepted at least one 
efficiency claim in “4.2 percent of settled matters, 6.9 percent of the PI matters, and 15.3 percent of 
the closed cases”); Daniel A. Crane, Rethinking Merger Efficiencies, 110 MICH. L. REV. 347, 358 & n.49 
(2011) (summarizing evidence that “practitioners report that the agencies usually react with coolness 
to efficiencies arguments”). 
 149 See Wilson, supra note 49. 
 150 See supra Section I.A.1. 
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paper, EDM generically results in lower prices for the final good sold by 
the integrated firm.151 This lower price will cause at least some 
substitution away from competing products—including those made by 
rival downstream firms—reducing these firms’ demand for inputs. Since 
the optimal input price charged by any upstream firm (with or without 
RRC) depends on the demand for that firm’s product, EDM, by itself, 
would generically lower the price charged to unintegrated downstream 
firms. Consequently, EDM both affects the RRC incentive (by lowering 
the unintegrated downstream firms’ demand for the input) and lowers the 
amount of the total price increase relative to a counterfactual world in 
which, arguendo, the vertically integrated firm is prevented from 
obtaining EDM. 
Given the link between the sizes of EDM and RRC effects, it is 
unsurprising that few, if any, structural screens reliably predict the net 
effects of mergers.152 For example, economists Gloria Sheu and Charles 
Taragin use simulated data to show that varying the number of upstream 
and downstream firms, and thus concentration, does not meaningfully 
affect the distribution of outcomes of vertical mergers.153 Instead, the data 
contain both harmful and beneficial vertical mergers in both concentrated 
and unconcentrated upstream and downstream markets, suggesting that 
concentration levels are not correlated with the effect of vertical mergers 
on consumer welfare. Sheu and Taragin find that “EDM between the 
merging firms is a primary determinant of whether there is consumer 
harm overall.”154 
Finally, in a recent comment to the FTC, Salinger describes a 
numerical example in which a single upstream firm sells to two 
downstream firms producing differentiated products.155 In the example, 
vertical integration between the upstream firm and one downstream firm 
not only lowers the final good price for the integrated downstream firm 
(because of EDM) but also lowers the final good price of the unintegrated 
downstream firm. This latter effect is the combination of an RRC effect 
(the integrated firm raises its price to the unintegrated firm to shift 
 
 151 See Das Varma & De Stefano, supra note 32, at 3 n.5. 
 152 But see Baker et al., supra note 4, at 16 (“If both markets are unconcentrated, it is less likely 
that a vertical merger would be anticompetitive.”). 
 153 See Gloria Sheu & Charles Taragin, Simulating Mergers in a Vertical Supply Chain with Bar-
gaining 24 (Apr. 15, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://perma.cc/4M7V-LKD5. 
 154 Id. at 25 (describing also how variation in randomly drawn margins “drives nearly all the var-
iation in harm”). 
 155 See Michael A. Salinger, Comment Letter on the Draft Vertical Merger Guidelines, at 3 (Feb. 
24, 2020), https://perma.cc/TK3R-7YPW. 
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demand to its downstream unit) and the unintegrated firm’s lower 
demand (caused by the integrated firm’s EDM and lower price). In the 
example, consumers are unambiguously better off because prices are 
lower and quantities are higher. While the example makes no claim to 
generality, it illustrates why RRC must be analyzed concurrently with 
EDM as described in the Vertical Merger Guidelines.156 
2. Anticompetitive Vertical Mergers Are Difficult to Distinguish 
from Procompetitive Mergers 
When analyzing horizontal mergers, the Agencies and courts employ 
a number of heuristics that are likely to be somewhat predictive about true 
outcomes. Qualitatively, documentary evidence—including closeness of 
competition, customer concerns, and win-loss records—speaks to the 
central question of the strength of the competitive constraint that will be 
lost with a horizontal merger. Quantitatively, even simple metrics—
including upward pricing pressure,157 change in Herfindahl index,158 and 
firm count159—have at least some predictive power. Even relatively coarse 
or imprecise measures may suffice for horizontal merger enforcement 
when the enforcement is predicated on a claim that the loss in 
competition is large and efficiencies are small. 
Tools used in horizontal merger analysis do not apply with equal force 
to vertical mergers. Without more, qualitative evidence showing RRC or 
foreclosure effects—such as concerns from rivals or documents indicating 
RRC is likely—is not outcome determinative on the question of whether 
the merger harms consumers because EDM and RRC must be analyzed 
concurrently.160 Various flavors of pricing pressure indices for vertical 
 
 156 See DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 3, at 5 (stating that the Agencies gen-
erally assess the “net effect” of “all changes to the merged firm’s unilateral incentives,” including both 
RRC and EDM). 
 157 See Miller et al., supra note 106, at 238 tbl.8 (showing that a matrix of upward pricing pressure 
terms premultiplied by an identity passthrough matrix is a reasonable approximation of true merger 
price effects, across a dataset of simulated industries). 
 158 See Volker Nocke & Michael D. Whinston, Concentration Screens for Horizontal Mergers 17, 
tbl.4 (Apr. 29, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://perma.cc/3REE-74B3 (showing that as “delta 
HHI” increases much greater efficiencies are needed, on average, to offset merger price effects). 
 159 See Charles Taragin & Margaret Loudermilk, Using Measures of Competitive Harm for Opti-
mal Screening of Horizontal Mergers 16 (Oct. 2, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://perma.cc/9YAQ-BUQQ (“Taken together these observations suggest that a significant amount 
of information about potential price effects is conveyed by the Firm Count measure.”). 
 160 See supra Section I.C.1. 
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mergers attempt to account for EDM.161 However, these indices perform 
poorly in simulations and are based on separate measurements of EDM 
and RRC that do not account for the effect of EDM on the size of RRC.162 
As discussed previously, firm count and concentration measures do not 
appear to be useful predictors of the net unilateral effect. Notably, the 
Vertical Merger Guidelines state merely that the Agencies “may consider 
measures of market shares and market concentration” but do not state 
that share is likely to be outcome determinative.163 The Vertical Merger 
Guidelines dropped a provision in earlier draft Guidelines that the 
Agencies would be unlikely to challenge a merger if both firms had market 
shares below twenty percent.164 
3. Evaluating EDM and RRC 
If plaintiffs are to assume the task of concurrently measuring EDM 
and RRC effects—as DOJ did to some extent in AT&T—there will naturally 
be methodological questions about the best way to implement this 
analysis. Unfortunately, there are few clear answers to these questions at 
this time. 
Merger simulation is one tool capable of concurrently and 
prospectively analyzing EDM and RRC, including the effect of the former 
on the size of the latter. DOJ used merger simulation in AT&T, although 
DOJ’s expert witness appears to have calculated EDM and RRC separately 
and then used them as inputs into a model of horizontal competition.165 
 
 161 See Serge Moresi & Steven C. Salop, vGUPPI: Scoring Unilateral Pricing Incentives in Vertical 
Mergers, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 185, 186 (2013). 
 162 See Gleb B. Domnenko & David S. Sibley, Simulating Vertical Mergers and the Vertical GUPPI 
Approach 16 (Jan. 1, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://perma.cc/HZ9T-2QCN (“Regarding the 
accuracy of the vertical GUPPI approach, our results are mostly negative.”); see also Gopal Das Varma 
& Martino DeStefano, Comment Letter on the Draft Vertical Merger Guidelines, at 8 (Feb. 26, 2020), 
https://perma.cc/XGW2-ALWU (“When we compare the predicted RRC effect using a price pressure 
analysis (that ignores change in output shares due to EDM) with that from an equilibrium simulation 
(that takes account of change in shares due to EDM), we find that the price pressure technique can 
significantly mis-predict the size of RRC.”). 
 163 See DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 3, at 3. 
 164 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, DRAFT VERTICAL MERGER GUIDELINES 8 
(2020), https://perma.cc/T9DJ-NRBB. 
 165 See Das Varma & De Stefano, supra note 32, at 11 n.13 (“Professor Shapiro’s expert report indi-
cates that he first used the standard approach to separately estimate the magnitudes of wholesale 
price increase and EDM. Those estimates then served as inputs in an equilibrium model of horizontal 
competition between cable companies that generated estimates of the effect of the merger on retail 
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Even with this simplification, the DOJ’s expert was unable to populate the 
model with credible inputs.166 Nonetheless, it is very likely that the next 
litigated vertical merger challenge will rely in part on a merger simulation 
model. While these models are at least capable of capturing the 
interaction between EDM and RRC, this capability comes at the expense 
of relatively strong assumptions about the curvature of demand and cost 
curves and, depending on the model, relatively high input requirements. 
These assumptions are not innocuous,167 and courts may struggle to 
understand the economic modelling required to concurrently weigh EDM 
and RRC.168 
An alternative approach, seemingly favored by proponents of a more 
interventionist policy towards vertical mergers, tasks plaintiffs only with 
measuring harmful effects of mergers and leaves it to defendants to 
measure procompetitive effects, including EDM.169 This approach could, 
for example, block mergers that exceed certain thresholds for market 
share in the upstream and downstream markets. As market shares are 
relatively easy to measure, this approach would have the advantage of 
being implementable. However, the approach would have the significant 
disadvantage of basing merger enforcement on metrics that are not 
correlated with the effect of a merger on consumer welfare. 
Vertical enforcement may be most feasible in the specialized 
circumstances where EDM is unlikely to result at all—for example, where 
the upstream and downstream firms make incompatible products.170 
Outside these special circumstances, the difficulty in distinguishing 
presumably rare anticompetitive vertical mergers from more common 
 
cable prices. Needless to say, this augmented standard approach does not incorporate the equilibrium 
effect of EDM on RRC.”). 
 166 See id. 
 167 See Miller et al., supra note 106, at 228 (finding that the error from upward-pricing-pressure 
predictions are often less than that from mis-specified merger simulations, which assume too much 
or too little demand curvature, relative to the true state of the world). 
 168 The number of times in which courts cite RRC is surprisingly small. We collected data from 
the Caselaw Access Project (“CAP”) of Harvard Law School. The CAP has a dataset that includes nearly 
1.7 million federal cases. The CAP’s Historical Trends tool searches for specific words and phrases 
from this dataset and graphs their frequency throughout time. Using this tool, we identified those 
federal cases that cite “raising rival’s cost.” In any given year, the number of cases that uses the term 
raising rival’s cost appears either 0 or 1 time except for three years where the term appeared in two 
cases. This limited judicial experience with vertical mergers suggests courts may be hesitant to grapple 
with complex economic models, at least in this context. 
 169 See, e.g., Baker et al., supra note 4, at 16–17 (summarizing various presumptions); Open Mar-
kets Institute, supra note 21, at 21–23. 
 170 See supra Section I.A.1. 
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procompetitive vertical mergers should suggest caution to the Agencies. If 
the information gathered during an investigation or in litigation is 
insufficient to reliably predict which vertical mergers are likely to harm 
consumers, then it is all the more important to keep in mind the empirical 
work finding that most vertical mergers are likely to improve consumer 
welfare.171 
4. Evaluating Efficiencies 
Vertical mergers may be particularly likely to result in efficiencies that 
benefit consumers.172 Thus, once the Agencies have assessed the net effect 
of EDM and RRC, their attention must turn to whether the magnitude of 
the net effect, if positive, likely exceeds the magnitude of efficiencies. 
As a general matter, there are practical impediments to quantifying 
efficiencies that may result from vertical mergers. Firms may not collect 
the necessary data for ex post measurement of efficiencies. Even if 
companies can quantify past merger efficiencies to show the ability to 
integrate post-merger, each quantification is fact-specific and includes 
other variables that may be hard to measure—for example, organizational 
structure, management and personnel issues, and cultural factors. 
Even if the Agencies had the tools to measure these efficiencies 
accurately, they may lack the theoretical framework to properly evaluate 
and weigh them. While the Agencies use simple tools like compensating 
marginal cost reduction to evaluate the magnitude of efficiencies that 
would be required to offset upward pricing pressure resulting from a 
horizontal merger,173 no comparable metric exists for vertical mergers. 
Since cognizable efficiencies, like EDM, incentivize the integrated firm to 
lower the price of its final good, the efficiencies may also affect the 
magnitude of any RRC effect.174 
The Vertical Merger Guidelines discuss EDM at length but state that 
efficiencies resulting from vertical mergers are analyzed under section 10 
of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, suggesting that holistic vertical 
merger efficiencies may not be given full consideration.175 Given that firms 
may not collect detailed accounting and survey data on the long-term 
 
 171 See Cooper et al., supra note 29, at 658; Global Antitrust Institute, supra note 29, at 6–9. 
 172 See supra Section I.A.2. 
 173 See Gregory J. Werden, A Robust Test for Consumer Welfare Enhancing Mergers Among Sellers of 
Differentiated Products, 44 J. INDUS. ECON. 409, 412–13 (1996). 
 174 See supra Section I.C.1. 
 175 See Wilson, supra note 49. 
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performance of prior acquisitions, the Agencies should incentivize better 
data collection by firms on past instances of vertical integration, by 
signaling that the Agencies will seriously consider such evidence in 
evaluating future mergers. The nature of vertical efficiencies suggests they 
may be, as a general matter, greater than those resulting from horizontal 
mergers. 
Given the broader problem, more studies should be conducted about 
optimization within firms—both via contract and via merger.176 Such 
studies could usefully identify additional types of efficiencies that 
vertically integrated firms may achieve. For example, it may be that 
increased digitization, artificial intelligence, and machine learning create 
new efficiencies not yet contemplated by many practitioners. 
D. Summary 
Part I outlines empirical results suggesting that many, if not most, 
vertical mergers benefit consumers, that harmful RRC effects depend on 
beneficial EDM effects, that these effects must be analyzed concurrently, 
and that it is likely that even most mergers that result in RRC increase 
consumer welfare. Against this backdrop, vertical merger enforcement 
should proceed cautiously, perhaps with a particular focus on special cases 
where EDM is likely to be zero or small. More generally, few reliable tools 
exist to distinguish rare anticompetitive mergers from common 
procompetitive vertical mergers. 
II. Legal Background 
Although the literature on potential anticompetitive effects reaches 
back decades—particularly in the case of foreclosure theories177—vertical 
merger challenges that result in decided cases always have been rare. 
Indeed, there were no decided vertical merger challenges at all for the first 
thirty-five years of the Clayton Act because the Agencies believed—
 
 176 See FRANCINE LAFONTAINE & MARGARET SLADE, EXCLUSIVE CONTRACTS AND VERTICAL 
RESTRAINTS: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 20, app. 1–3 tbl.1–3 (2005) (providing a table 
summarizing “studies that assess the consequences of all types of vertical restraints and legal re-
strictions on vertical contracts” as “highlight[ing] how very few studies there really are in each category 
and in total” and concluding that “[c]learly, much more work is needed in this area”). 
 177 See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co., Inc. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 328–34 (1962) (raising both input 
and customer foreclosure, which were already well-developed theories by 1962). 
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reasonably—that the original statute did not reach vertical mergers at 
all.178 
After an abortive attempt to use the Sherman Act instead,179 Congress 
revised the Clayton Act in 1950 to “make it clear” that the Agencies had 
the authority to challenge anticompetitive vertical mergers under section 
7.180 Over the next thirty years, the Agencies brought a number of 
significant vertical merger enforcement actions, almost always winning. 
Over time, the courts developed a six-factor test—purportedly drawn 
from the then-current economic learning and the legislative history of 
section 7—that treated vertical mergers as highly suspect.181 The Agencies 
likewise cast a jaundiced eye; in the DOJ’s 1968 Merger Guidelines, the 
DOJ asserted that almost any “large vertical merger” likely violated section 
7 because the likely procompetitive efficiencies would rarely, if ever, offset 
the likely anticompetitive harms.182 
During this period, the DOJ and FTC challenged twenty-seven 
vertical mergers.183 The Supreme Court said that “[t]aken as a whole, the 
legislative history illuminates congressional concern with the protection 
of competition, not competitors, and its desire to restrain mergers only to 
the extent that such combinations may tend to lessen competition.”184 Yet 
in an era when multiple goals of antitrust played a prominent role, the 
courts often interpreted section 7 to protect less efficient competitors. 
Around the same time, however, new economic evidence began to 
emerge demonstrating the procompetitive benefits of vertical 
 
 178 See infra Section II.A 
 179 See United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 522, 524–27 (1948). 
 180 See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 590 (1957). 
 181 See Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 328–29, 332; E.I. du Pont de Nemours, 353 U.S. at 591–95; Miss. 
River Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 454 F.2d 1083, 1091 (8th Cir. 1972); U.S. Steel Corp. v. Fed. Trade 
Comm’n, 426 F.2d 593, 599 (1970). 
 182 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MERGER GUIDELINES 9–10 (1968), https://perma.cc/VVP6-WEBE 
(“While it is true that in some instances vertical integration may raise barriers to entry or disadvantage 
existing competitors only as the result of the achievement of significant economies of production or 
distribution (as, for example, where the increase in barriers is due to achievement of economies of 
integrated production through an alteration of the structure of the plant as well as of the firm), inte-
gration accomplished by a large vertical merger will usually raise entry barriers or disadvantage com-
petitors to an extent not accounted for by, and wholly disproportionate to, such economies as may 
result from the merger.”). 
 183 See Alan A. Fisher & Richard S. Sciacca, An Economic Analysis of Vertical Merger Enforcement 
Policy, 6 RES. L. & ECON. 1, 59 tbl.8 (1984). 
 184 Brown Shoe , 370 U.S. at 320 (emphasis in original). 
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integration.185 This economic learning did not immediately make its way 
to the Agencies or the courts. 
At first, these efficiencies were treated as further evidence of 
anticompetitive harm. For example, in 1964 the DOJ convinced a district 
court that vertical mergers, although “[t]hey often lead to economic and 
efficient operation” and are therefore “desirable from an economic 
standpoint,” were nonetheless “undesirable from a social standpoint” and 
proscribed by section 7.186 In its 1968 Merger Guidelines, the DOJ 
announced its intention to challenge a proposed vertical merger between 
a supplier with at least ten percent of sales and a purchaser with at least 
six percent.187 Likewise, in the early 1970s, the FTC convinced two circuit 
courts that the presence of large vertical merger efficiencies harmed less 
efficient local rivals, making the underlying merger unlawful under 
section 7.188 
Yet soon thereafter, the Supreme Court reminded the lower courts 
that the antitrust laws were designed “for the protection of competition, 
not competitors,”189 and meant it. A new set of cases suggested that there 
were plausible procompetitive reasons for many vertical contractual 
restraints.190 The lower courts duly changed course. In 1979, the Second 
Circuit rejected an FTC vertical merger challenge, concluding that section 
7 requires the plaintiff in a vertical merger challenge to show actual harm 
to competition, not simply foreclosure.191 It also recognized that, by 
combining complementary stages of production, vertical mergers “may 
 
 185 See, e.g., Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19, 
33–34 (1957); Ward S. Bowman, Jr., The Prerequisites and Effects of Resale Price Maintenance, 22 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 825, 855–58 (1955); Aaron Director & Edward H. Levi, Law and the Future: Trade Regulation, 51 
NW. U. L. REV. 281, 290 (1956); Lester G. Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & 
ECON. 86, 104–05 (1960). 
 186 United States v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 231 F. Supp. 95, 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). 
 187 See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 182, at 10. 
 188 See Miss. River Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 454 F.2d 1083, 1091–92 (8th Cir. 1972); U.S. Steel 
Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 426 F.2d 593, 593, 601–03, 609–10 (1970). 
 189 Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977) (quoting Brown Shoe, 
370 U.S. at 320). 
 190 See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58 (1977) (“Certainly, there has 
been no showing in this case, either generally or with respect to Sylvania’s agreements, that vertical 
restrictions have or are likely to have a pernicious effect on competition or that they lack [] any re-
deeming virtue. Accordingly, we conclude that the per se rule stated in Schwinn must be overruled.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); see also State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 15 (1997); Business Elecs. 
Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723–26 (1988). 
 191 See Fruehauf Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 603 F.2d 345, 355 (2d Cir. 1979). 
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even operate to increase competition.”192 In 1984, the DOJ issued Non-
Horizontal Merger Guidelines recognizing—in stark contrast to its 1968 
statement—that vertical mergers “are less likely than horizontal mergers 
to create competitive problems[.]”193 
Since the Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines, the Agencies have 
averaged a handful—typically two or three—of significant vertical merger 
matters each year.194 The vast majority—all but AT&T’s acquisition of Time 
Warner—were abandoned, cleared without conditions, or cleared subject 
to a consent agreement. Although the pace of significant merger 
challenges has increased somewhat in the past couple of years, vertical 
merger challenges remain far rarer than those involving horizontal 
transactions. 
This Part synthesizes the extant vertical merger law. In doing so, it 
illustrates the courts’ shift in thinking about vertical mergers. From an 
institutional standpoint, it also details how courts have applied economic 
concepts in vertical merger cases. 
A. The Early Application of Section 7 to Vertical Mergers (Pre-1980) 
As an “anti-trust” law, section 7 of the Clayton Act was originally 
aimed at prohibiting stock transactions that allowed horizontal 
competitors to form into large trusts—most notably, the Standard Oil 
trust.195 Although vertical mergers were fairly common, the Agencies did 
not challenge any vertical mergers for many years because the original Act 
did not, as the Supreme Court later said, “appear to preclude the 
acquisition of stock in any corporation other than a direct competitor.”196 
Specifically, section 7 originally prohibited stock acquisitions “where the 
effect of such acquisition may be to substantially lessen competition 
between the corporation whose stock is so acquired and the corporation 
making the acquisition, or to restrain such commerce in any section or 
community, or tend to create a monopoly of any line of commerce.”197 
 
 192 Id. at 352. 
 193 DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 13, at 23. 
 194 See Salop & Culley, supra note 131, at 1; see also Chamber of Commerce of the United States of 
America, Comment Letter on the Draft Vertical Merger Guidelines, at 2 (Feb. 14, 2020), 
https://perma.cc/P8ML-MPMS. 
 195 See, e.g., Barak Orbach & D. Daniel Sokol, Antitrust Energy, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 429, 431, 445 
(2012) (describing issues surrounding Standard Oil). 
 196 Brown Shoe Co., Inc. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 313 (1962). 
 197 Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1914) (emphasis added); see also United States v. E.I. du Pont de 
Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 589 (1957) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 18). 
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From the statute’s passage, the FTC interpreted section 7—
particularly the clause quoted above—to apply only to stock acquisitions 
involving horizontal competitors. For example, in its 1929 report to 
Congress, the Commission noted many vertical mergers—which it then 
called “integrated industries”—that it could not review: 
During the year the commission’s attention has been directed to a number of 
consolidations and combinations involving noncompeting products. Two or three of the 
largest involved concerns engaged in a nation-wide business in food products. Some of 
these inquiries are still pending. However, most of these consolidations and acquisitions 
were of corporations engaged in the distribution of allied but noncompetitive products. 
Preliminary inquiry disclosed that the commission could take no corrective action under 
the Clayton Act even though the consolidation was effected through the acquisition or 
exchange of capital stock. The trend toward consolidation of integrated industries was 
very pronounced at the close of the year.198 
Although the Commission believed it lacked legal authority to 
challenge vertical transactions, these deals were—and remain—
commonplace. Altogether, the Commission determined that twenty-five 
percent (49 of 196 “inquiries”) of the merger investigations it completed in 
1929 “were filed [closed] without action because of lack of competition, 
either because of the territory served or that the products involved were not 
competitive.”199 In addition to “food products,”200 the Commission 
identified “[o]ther acquisitions or mergers of integrated lines involv[ing] 
aviation, radio, talking machines, rubber goods, motion pictures, oil, 
drugs, and chemicals.”201 
Given its perceived lack of legal authority, the Commission, for many 
years, urged Congress to revise the statute to encompass vertical 
transactions,202 and Congress, for many years, did not act. Finally, as part 
of a much broader package of antitrust amendments in 1950, Congress 
altered section 7 so that it covered vertical transactions.203 As later 
explained by the Supreme Court: 
[B]y the deletion [in the 1950 amendment] of the ‘acquiring-acquired’ language in the 
original text, [Congress] hoped to make plain that § 7 applied not only to mergers between 
 
 198 FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANN. REP. 60 (1929), https://perma.cc/K3EC-Q8Y6.  
 199 Id. (emphasis added). 
 200 Id. 
 201 Id. at 7. 
 202 See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co., Inc. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 313 n.21 (1962) (“[The opinion 
that § 7 did not reach vertical transactions] was the manner in which the Federal Trade Commission 
had viewed the prohibitions of original § 7.”). 
 203 See Cellar-Kefauver Act, Pub. L. No. 81–899, § 7, 64 Stat. 1125, 1126 (1950). 
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actual competitors, but also to vertical and conglomerate mergers whose effect may tend 
to lessen competition in any line of commerce in any section of the country.204 
The Supreme Court also noted that “the deletion of the ‘acquiring-
acquired’ test was the direct result of an amendment offered by the Federal 
Trade Commission” and subsequently introduced by Congressman Estes 
Kefauver.205 
The Supreme Court defined the contours of section 7 more precisely 
in the late 1950s and early 1960s. In United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours 
& Co.206—a case the DOJ brought in 1949 on the eve of the Cellar–Kefauver 
Amendments—the Court ignored the “acquired-acquiring” limitation in 
the original statute and ruled that section 7 reached vertical mergers even 
before its amendment.207 In Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, the Court 
condemned a vertical merger combining a shoe manufacturer that 
accounted for “about 4% of the Nation’s total footwear production” with a 
shoe retailer that made “about 1.2% of all national retail shoe sales.”208 
Brown Shoe also established four foundational legal rules applicable to 
vertical mergers. First, the Court concluded from the legislative history 
and plain terms of section 7 that Congress “recognized the stimulation to 
competition that might flow from particular mergers” and therefore 
“sought to create an effective tool for preventing all mergers having 
demonstrable anti-competitive effects.”209 Consequently, the statute 
“would not impede, for example, a merger between two small companies 
to enable the combination to compete more effectively with larger 
corporations dominating the relevant market.”210 The Court also 
recognized that, although “[e]very extended vertical arrangement by its 
very nature, for at least a time, denies to competitors of the supplier the 
 
 204 Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 317. Nevertheless, “[i]n short, the legislative history, like the statute, 
leaves the courts free to formulate, and to change, rules governing vertical mergers in light of the kind 
of economic analysis and administrative considerations that apply to horizontal mergers and antitrust 
issues generally.” AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 140, ¶ 1002. 
 205 Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 317 n.30. 
 206 353 U.S. 586 (1957). 
 207 Id. at 592 (“We hold that any acquisition by one corporation of all or any part of the stock of 
another corporation, competitor or not, is within the reach of the section whenever the reasonable 
likelihood appears that the acquisition will result in a restraint of commerce or in the creation of a 
monopoly of any line of commerce.”). The dissent is also worth noting because it focuses on the “com-
petitive merits” of the case. See id. at 628 (Burton, J., dissenting). This also came up in two cases from 
the 1970s. United States v. Hammermill Paper Co., 429 F. Supp. 1271, 1288 (W.D. Pa. 1977); Findings of 
Fact, United States v. IT&T, No. 69 C 924, 1971 WL 541 at *36 (N.D. Ill. Jul. 2, 1971). 
 208 Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 303. 
 209 Id. at 319. 
 210 Id. 
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opportunity to compete for part or all of the trade of the customer-party 
to the vertical arrangement,” the “Clayton Act does not render unlawful 
all such vertical arrangements,” but rather only those whose effect may be 
to substantially reduce competition.211 
Second, the assessment of competitive effects—presumably both 
procompetitive and anticompetitive—was necessarily probabilistic. As the 
Court explained, “Congress used the words ‘may be substantially to lessen 
competition,’ . . . to indicate that its concern was with probabilities, not 
certainties.”212 The Court also said—presumably for the same reason—that 
“the tests for measuring the legality of any particular economic 
arrangement under the Clayton Act are to be less stringent than those 
used in applying the Sherman Act.”213 
Third, the Court reiterated that even in vertical mergers, 
“[d]etermination of the relevant market is a necessary predicate to a 
finding of a violation of the Clayton Act.”214 As revised, section 7 prohibits 
only transactions whose effect “may be substantially to lessen 
competition, or to tend to create a monopoly” in “any line of commerce 
. . . in any section of the country.”215 The statute therefore requires a 
plaintiff to define both “a product market (the ‘line of commerce’) and a 
geographic market (the ‘section of the country’)” in which the 
anticompetitive effects would be felt.216 
Fourth, the Court determined that both economic and noneconomic 
factors would determine whether the effect of the transaction “may be 
substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.”217 
The Court specifically identified three factors: (1) “the size of the share of 
the market foreclosed”;218 (2) “the very nature and purpose of the 
arrangement,”219 the latter of which it clarified to mean “the economic 
purpose of[] the vertical arrangement”;220 and (3) “the trend toward 
 
 211 Id. at 324. 
 212 Id. at 323. 
 213 Id. at 328–29. 
 214 Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 324 (quoting United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours, 353 U.S. 586, 
593 (1957)). 
 215 15 U.S.C. § 18. 
 216 Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 324. 
 217 15 U.S.C. § 18. 
 218 Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 328. 
 219 Id. at 329. 
 220 Id.; see also id. at 331 (“The importance which Congress attached to economic purpose is fur-
ther demonstrated by the Senate and House Reports on H.R. 2734 . . . .”). 
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concentration in the industry,” which it curiously interpreted to include 
any “trend toward vertical integration.”221 
The Court ultimately found that both economic and noneconomic 
factors aligned against the merger of Brown Shoe and Kinney. Like the 
district court, the Court concluded that the merger foreclosed what it 
believed to be a significant share of the downstream market—“over 350 
retail outlets,” or 1.2% of retail sales. It also concluded that the economic 
purpose of the merger was to allow Brown Shoe to vertically integrate, 
which it characterized as a form of tying—an offense per se unlawful at 
the time.222 Finally, the court found “[t]he existence of a trend toward 
vertical integration,” which in turn produced “a tendency of the acquiring 
manufacturers to become increasingly important sources of supply for 
their acquired outlets.”223 This vertical integration would result in “the 
foreclosure of independent manufacturers from markets otherwise open 
to them. . . . without producing any countervailing competitive, 
economic, or social advantages.”224 
From this mix of economic and noneconomic factors, the courts 
gradually distilled a disjunctive legal test under which a plaintiff could 
prevail if it showed that any of six factors—or more often, two or more 
factors—was present.225 The Sixth Circuit formulated the definitive list in 
1970, which the Eighth Circuit echoed two years later: 
In dealing with vertical acquisitions under Section 7, as amended, the United States 
Supreme Court has relied on several functional factors as indicia of the requisite anti-
competitive effect: (1) foreclosing of the competitors of either party from a segment of the 
market otherwise open to them; (2) the “nature and purpose” of the vertical arrangement; 
(3) actual and reasonable likely adverse effects upon local industries and small business; 
 
 221 Id. at 332. Yet, as the D.C. Circuit observed many years later, “vertical mergers produce no 
immediate change in the relevant market share.” United States v. AT&T Corp., 916 F.3d 1029, 1032 
(D.C. Cir. 2019). 
 222 Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 332 (“[I]t is apparent both from past behavior of Brown and from the 
testimony of Brown’s President, that Brown would use its ownership of Kinney to force Brown shoes 
into Kinney stores. Thus, in operation this vertical arrangement would be quite analogous to one in-
volving a tying clause.”). 
  The Court also relied upon a tying theory in a subsequent case, Ford Motor Co. v. United 
States, 405 U.S. 562, 568–69 (1972) (“[The district court concluded that] Ford’s acquisition of the Au-
tolite assets, particularly when viewed in the context of the original equipment (OE) tie and of GM’s 
ownership of AC, has the result of transmitting the rigidity of the oligopolistic structure of the auto-
mobile industry to the spark plug industry . . . . We see no answer to that conclusion if the letter and 
spirit of the Celler-Kefauver Antimerger Act are to be honored.”). 
 223 Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 332. 
 224 Id. at 332, 334. 
 225 The development of this legal test mirrors the development of the law of vertical restraints, 
particularly tying and exclusive dealing, during this era. 
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(4) the level and trend of concentration in the market shares of the participating 
companies, including any trend towards domination by a few leaders; (5) the existence of 
a trend towards vertical integration and consolidation in previously independent 
industries; and (6) the ease with which potential entrants may readily overcome barriers 
to full entry and compete effectively with existing companies.226 
In contrast, the DOJ limited its enforcement decisions to two 
economic factors: market shares and entry barriers.227 Reflecting the times 
and particularly the paltry market shares involved in cases like Brown Shoe, 
the DOJ set its enforcement thresholds quite low. It announced: “[T]he 
department will ordinarily challenge a merger or series of mergers 
between a supplying firm, accounting for approximately 10% or more of 
the sales in its market, and one or more purchasing firms, accounting in 
toto for approximately 6% or more of the total purchases in that 
market.”228 
The courts, however, initially declined to limit their analysis to 
economic factors or misapplied the economic factors when they did 
consider them.229 The FTC’s cement enforcement program illustrates both 
approaches. In one case, U.S. Steel Corp. v. FTC,230 the Sixth Circuit 
enforced an FTC administrative order after finding that all six vertical 
merger factors were present.231 The court was particularly concerned that 
the integration by merger of the upstream cement supplier (U.S. Steel 
subsidiary U.A.C.) and the downstream cement distributor “ha[d] decisive 
cost advantages over non-integrated competitors.”232 The court explained 
that “[v]ertical integration creates a more assured level of plant utilization, 
an elimination of any significant sales and marketing expenses to ones’ 
 
 226 U.S. Steel Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 426 F.2d 592, 599 (6th Cir. 1970); see also Miss. River 
Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 454 F.2d 1083, 1091 (8th Cir. 1972) (listing the same six factors). 
 227 See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 182, at 10 (“[T]he Department attaches primary significance 
to (i) the market share of the supplying firm, (ii) the market share of the purchasing firm or firms, and 
(iii) the conditions of entry in the purchasing firm’s market.”). 
 228 Id. 
 229 Although in keeping with some of the economics of the day, the Supreme Court’s decision in 
FTC v. Consol. Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965), is a special case within the vertical merger jurispru-
dence because it relied upon a theory—reciprocal buying—that has not been viewed as anticompeti-
tive for many years. See id. at 594 (“We hold at the outset that the ‘reciprocity’ made possible by such 
an acquisition is one of the congeries of anticompetitive practices at which the antitrust laws are 
aimed.”); see also Edward D. Cavanagh, Reciprocal Dealing: A Rebirth?, 75 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 633, 635 
(2001) (In the 1970s, “[t]he Antitrust Division ceased initiating reciprocity cases. At about the same 
time, reciprocity as a theory of antitrust wrongdoing also came under heavy attack from antitrust 
scholars and, until recently, has remained largely dormant.”). 
 230 426 F.2d 592 (6th Cir. 1970). 
 231 See id. at 599. 
 232 Id. at 603. 
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own ready-mix subsidiary, and the ability to integrate the storage and 
distribution facilities of the cement and ready-mix company into a single 
urban terminal.”233 Even worse (at least in the court’s view), these dynamics 
“forced [rivals] to expand or shift their sales territories to areas where there 
was less vertical integration because of the competitive forces in vertically 
integrating markets,”234 and “at least one” rival was forced to vertically 
integrate itself to meet the competition.235 It therefore found “very 
substantial evidence for each of the Commission’s findings that the ability 
[of ] non-integrated cement producers (to compete) may be substantially 
impaired,” the merging parties “may have achieved a decisive competitive 
advantage over its competitors,” and the “trend towards vertical 
[integration] in the production and sale of cement and concrete has been 
aggravated” by the merger.236 For all these reasons, the court concluded 
that the merger violated section 7. 
The Eighth Circuit repeated this approach two years later when it 
enforced an FTC administrative order in a second cement case, Mississippi 
River Corp. v. FTC.237 In that case, a series of vertical mergers foreclosed 
between 1.3% and 3.7% of the downstream market for ready-mix concrete 
in several midwestern cities.238 The FTC—and subsequently the Eighth 
Circuit—found these mergers anticompetitive239 in part because they had 
an “immediate[]” and “adverse” impact on a rival local business.240 
Ironically, however, the local business there was U.S. Steel, which, fresh 
off its loss to the FTC in the Sixth Circuit, “was forced to close a Cincinnati 
terminal in 1967 after three years of operation because of the loss of [one 
of the acquired distributor’s] business.”241 
The FTC was not alone in this quest. For example, in United States v. 
Ford Motor Co.,242 the DOJ sought, a district court granted, and the 
 
 233 Id. at 603. 
 234 Id. at 601–02. 
 235 Id. at 602 (“The [FTC Hearing] Examiner specifically found that at least one of the vertical 
acquisitions in the industry was caused, in part, by U.A.C.’s acquisition of Certified.”). 
 236 U.S. Steel Corp., 426 F.2d at 604 (internal quotations omitted). 
 237 454 F.2d 1083 (8th Cir. 1972). 
 238 See id. at 1091. 
 239 Downstream market shares were disputed, with the defendant arguing the shares amounted 
to 1.3 to 3.7 percent and the Commission fixing the figure at 25 percent. The court punted, finding 
“the foreclosure by Mississippi to fall into the prohibited zone even if the wider market lines were to 
be drawn.” Id. 
 240 Id. at 1092. 
 241 Id. 
 242 405 U.S. 562 (1972). 
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Supreme Court affirmed a divestiture order on a mix of both social and 
economic grounds.243 In addition to unwinding the consummated vertical 
merger, the remedy also required Ford to include provisions in the 
divestiture sale that would “protect” the workers at the divested factory 
from job or wage cuts for several years.244 
The underlying tension between economic and noneconomic factors 
broke in 1979, when the Second Circuit concluded that section 7 did not 
condemn procompetitive vertical mergers. The case, Fruehauf Corp. v. 
FTC,245 involved the vertical merger of Fruehauf, a truck trailer 
manufacturer, with Kelsey, an upstream manufacturer of truck parts. The 
FTC condemned the merger on two grounds: (1) the transaction 
foreclosed rival input suppliers from Fruehauf’s demand, which 
amounted to about five percent of the market, and (2) if a parts shortage 
arose, the merger would allow Fruehauf preferential access to those 
supplies.246 
The Second Circuit disagreed; it explained that “[a] vertical merger, 
unlike a horizontal one, does not eliminate a competing buyer or seller 
from the market . . . does not, therefore, automatically have an 
anticompetitive effect . . . or reduce competition,” and “may even operate 
to increase competition.”247 Although the Second Circuit believed du Pont 
and Brown Shoe occasionally “appear[] to encourage” a legal rule 
proscribing “any vertical foreclosure,” it concluded that “[t]he Supreme 
Court’s insistence . . . that the Clayton Act protects ‘competition, not 
competitors,’ contravenes the notion that a significant level of foreclosure 
is itself the proscribed effect.”248 The court explained: 
[W]e are unwilling to assume that any vertical foreclosure lessens competition. Absent 
very high market concentration or some other factor threatening a tangible 
anticompetitive effect, a vertical merger may simply realign sales patterns . . . [and] free 
up that much of the market . . . for new transactions between the merged firm’s 
competitors and the merging firm’s competitors.249 
 
 243 See id. at 571, 575. 
 244 See id. at 572 (affirming remedial provisions designed to “protect[] New Fostoria, the town 
where the Autolite plant is located” and “protect[] employees of the New Fostoria plant by ordering 
Ford to condition its divestiture sale on the purchaser’s assuming the existing wage and pension obli-
gations”). 
 245 603 F.2d 345 (2d Cir. 1979). 
 246 See id. at 349. 
 247 Id. at 351–52. 
 248 Id. at 352, 352 n.9. 
 249 Id. at 352 n.9. 
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The Second Circuit concluded that “[a] showing of some probable 
anticompetitive impact is still essential,”250 and the Commission’s case 
rested upon evidence “too ephemeral to sustain [its] decision.”251 
B. The Consent Era (1980–2017) 
The FTC’s loss in Fruehauf ended the era of aggressive—and 
sometimes economically irrational—vertical merger enforcement. With 
the Agencies burdened by the requirement to demonstrate that a vertical 
merger would cause anticompetitive effects, not merely foreclosure, 
vertical merger litigation became more difficult. 
This change in the legal regime was coupled with new agency 
leadership steeped in the new economic learning on vertical integration. 
At the DOJ, Bill Baxter withdrew the 1968 Guidelines, replacing them with 
both the 1982 Horizontal Merger Guidelines and the 1984 Non-Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines. Economist Jim Miller initiated similar changes as FTC 
Chairman. 
Assistant Attorney General Baxter’s 1984 Non-Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines were particularly important. The Guidelines began by 
recognizing the same foundational concept the Second Circuit identified 
in Fruehauf: “non-horizontal mergers”—and particularly vertical 
mergers—“are less likely than horizontal mergers to create competitive 
problems.”252 
The Guidelines therefore abandoned three core features of earlier 
cases. First, eschewing the amorphous and easily satisfied six-factor test, 
the Division instead developed separate legal tests for three different 
vertical theories of harm, when a vertical merger may (1) increase barriers 
to entry; (2) facilitate collusion; or (3) allow a regulated entity to evade rate 
regulation.253 Second, the Division abandoned the share thresholds it had 
set in 1968 (and the even lower thresholds endorsed in Brown Shoe and 
other cases), announcing that it was “unlikely to challenge a merger” that 
may increase barriers to entry or facilitate collusion “unless overall 
concentration of the upstream market is above 1800 HHI.”254 Third, the 
Guidelines emphatically rejected the view—as expressed, for example, in 
U.S. Steel—that efficiencies produced by vertical integration were 
 
 250 Id. at 353. 
 251 Fruehauf, 603 F.2d at 360. 
 252 DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 13, at 24. 
 253 See id. at 30–32. 
 254 Id. at 31–32. 
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necessarily anticompetitive because they harmed competitors. Instead, 
the Guidelines stated that “[t]he primary benefit of mergers to the 
economy is their efficiency-enhancing potential, which can increase the 
competitiveness of firms and result in lower prices to consumers.”255 
Therefore “[a]n extensive pattern of vertical integration may constitute 
evidence that substantial economies are afforded by vertical integration” 
and consequently the Division “will give relatively more weight to 
expected efficiencies in determining whether to challenge a vertical 
merger than in determining whether to challenge a horizontal merger.”256 
The Division was not alone; many leading scholars and policymakers 
recognized that vertical mergers were inherently more likely to generate 
efficiencies—and inherently less likely to harm competition—than their 
horizontal counterparts.257 This remains the near-consensus view today.258 
Updates to critical inputs (law and economics) significantly affected 
the Agencies’ outputs (enforcement decisions). As Steven Salop noted 
recently, the Commission has not litigated a purely vertical case since 
Fruehauf.259 Similarly, until AT&T, the Division had not litigated a vertical 
merger to a decision since 1977.260 
Instead, the Agencies shifted to resolving vertical concerns through 
consent agreements.261 Most of the time, the Agencies accepted a slate of 
standard behavioral remedies—for example firewalls, nondiscrimination 
requirements, and licensing obligations.262 A minority (perhaps 20%–25%) 
 
 255 Id. at 23 (applicable to horizontal mergers); see also id. at 32 (endorsing the view that the effi-
ciencies applicable to horizontal transactions equally apply to vertical mergers). 
 256 Id. at 32. 
 257 See Fisher & Sciacca, supra note 183, at 39. 
 258 See, e.g., Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC v. FCC, 717 F.3d 982, 990 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (Kavanaugh, 
J., concurring) (noting that, in general, “vertical integration and vertical contracts are procompetitive”); 
Nat’l Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 468 F.3d 831, 840 (D.C. Cir. 2006) 
(“[V]ertical integration creates efficiencies for consumers.”); Hoffman, supra note 5, at 4 (noting the 
“broad consensus in competition policy and economic theory that the majority of vertical mergers are 
beneficial because they reduce costs and increase the intensity of interbrand competition”); Salop & 
Culley, supra note 14, at 15 (“[M]ost vertical mergers do not raise competitive concerns and likely are 
procompetitive.”). 
 259 See Salop, supra note 14, at 1964 (“The last vertical merger case litigated to conclusion by the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) dates back to 1979, which the FTC lost because it was unable to 
prove probable anticompetitive effects.” (citing Fruehauf Corp. v. FTC, 603 F.2d 345, 352–53 (2d Cir. 
1979))). 
 260 See United States v. Hammermill Paper Co., 429 F. Supp. 1271, 1278 (W.D. Pa. 1977). 
 261 For a helpful summary, see Salop & Culley, supra note 131. 
 262 See, e.g., United States v. Sprint Corp., No. 95-1304, 1995 WL 819147 (D.D.C. 1995) (acknowl-
edging both firewall and non-discrimination requirements); In re Merck & Co., Inc., FTC Docket No. 
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of these consents required the divestiture of a vertically related subsidiary, 
asset, or contract.263 
Of course, not all vertical mergers required consents. For example, in 
the early 2000s the FTC analyzed two facially similar vertical mergers, (1) 
Cytyc’s acquisition of Digene and (2) Synopsis’ acquisition of Avant!.264 The 
former involved the merger of two “complementary cervical cancer 
screening tests,” whereas the latter involved the merger of two 
“complementary integrated circuit design software products.”265 The 
Commission found that Cytyc would have the ability and incentive to 
harm rivals with relatively few countervailing efficiencies.266 In contrast, 
the Commission found that Synopsis had little incentive to impede 
interoperability with its upstream rivals and would realize significant 
efficiencies from the transaction.267 Without divulging specifics, then-
Chairman Tim Muris also intimated that customers generally supported 
the merger of Synopsis and Avant!.268 Given these different fact patterns, 
the Commission chose to challenge the merger of Cytyc and Digene 
(which was subsequently abandoned) and clear the merger of Synopsis and 
Avant! without conditions. 
On the other end of the spectrum, the Agencies have on occasion 
required unusual behavioral remedies.269 Some, particularly during 
President Obama’s first term, resembled sectoral regulations. For 
example, the DOJ’s consent decree resolving Comcast’s acquisition of 
NBCU imposed a duty to deal with rivals, arbitrate disputes over the terms 
of dealing, and agree to net neutrality rules.270 Others, such as the FTC’s 
 
C-3853 (Feb. 18, 1999) (including both firewall and nondiscrimination requirements); In re Raytheon 
Co., FTC Docket No. C-3681 (Sept. 3, 1996) (discussing firewall requirements). 
 263 See, e.g., United States v. United Techs. Corp., 946 F. Supp. 2d 135, 140 (D.D.C. 2013) (discussing 
divestiture of shares in a joint venture and obligation to divest, upon request, select assets); In re Do-
minion Res., Inc. & Consol. Nat. Gas Co., FTC Docket No. C-3901 (Nov. 4, 1999) (discussing divestiture 
of one downstream subsidiary); In re TRW, Inc., FTC Docket No. C-3790 (Apr. 6, 1998) (discussing 
divestiture of a contract). 
 264 See Timothy J. Muris, Principles for a Successful Competition Agency, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 165, 184–
86 (2005) (providing a contemporaneous comparison of the two matters). 
 265 Id. at 185. 
 266 See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Seeks to Block Cytyc Corp.’s Acquisition of Digene 
Corp. (June 24, 2002), https://perma.cc/AQN7-WKQN. 
 267 See Muris, supra note 264, at 185–86. 
 268 See id. 
 269 See Wilson & Klovers, supra note 15, at 2. 
 270 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Div., Justice Department Allows Comcast-
NBCU Joint Venture to Proceed with Conditions (Jan. 18, 2011), https://perma.cc/CE97-9694 (“The 
Department of Justice announced today a settlement with Comcast Corp. and General Electric Co.’s 
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consent order in Bosch’s acquisition of SPX, imposed compulsory royalty-
free patent licensing regimes.271 
C. Recent Developments (Post-2017) 
After almost forty years without a litigated vertical merger challenge, 
the DOJ finally broke the streak in 2017. In United States v. AT&T Inc., the 
Division alleged that the vertical merger of AT&T and Time Warner—two 
firms in the cable industry—would allow the combined firm to raise rivals’ 
costs of a critical input: cable programming.272 After the DOJ filed suit, the 
parties issued irrevocable offers to arbitrate program carriage disputes, 
thereby removing AT&T’s ability—if not incentive—to raise rivals’ costs 
(or completely foreclose rivals).273 On this basis, the district court found 
the merger did not violate section 7 because it did not risk any 
anticompetitive effects but did promise procompetitive efficiencies.274 
While the case identified both procompetitive and anticompetitive 
justifications for mergers, it did not break new ground in thinking about 
weighing these effects. 
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit took the opportunity to restate and clarify 
the basic legal rules that apply to vertical mergers. Citing Brown Shoe, the 
district court noted that “the government must show that the proposed 
merger is likely to substantially lessen competition, which encompasses a 
concept of ‘reasonable probability.’”275 It also noted that “[n]either the 
government nor the defendants challenge application of the burden-
shifting framework”276 used in United States v. Baker Hughes,277 under which 
the plaintiff bears the initial burden to establish a prima facie case, which 
the defendant may rebut.278 However, “unlike horizontal mergers,” the 
court explained that “the government cannot use a short cut to establish 
a presumption of anticompetitive effect through statistics about the 
change in market concentration, because vertical mergers produce no 
 
subsidiary NBC Universal Inc. (NBCU) that allows their joint venture to proceed conditioned on the 
parties’ agreement to license programming to online competitors to Comcast’s cable TV services, sub-
ject themselves to anti-retaliation provisions and adhere to Open Internet requirements.”). 
 271 See In re Robert Bosch GmbH, FTC Docket No. C-4377, at 13 (Apr. 23, 2013). 
 272 United States v. AT&T, Inc., 916 F.3d 1029, 1035 (D.C. Cir. 2019). 
 273 See id. at 1031. 
 274 See id. at 1037, 1041. 
 275 Id. at 1032. 
 276 Id. 
 277 908 F.2d 981, 982–83 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
 278 See AT&T, 916 F.3d at 1032. 
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immediate change in the relevant market share.”279 Rather, “the 
government must make a ‘fact-specific showing’ that the proposed merger 
is ‘likely to be anticompetitive.’”280 The D.C. Circuit found neither clear 
error in the district court’s findings of fact nor abuse of discretion in its 
decision to deny injunctive relief, and therefore it affirmed the district 
court’s judgment.281 
Most recently, the Agencies issued new Vertical Merger Guidelines.282 
A draft version of the Guidelines was extensively debated publicly and 
criticized as either too permissive or too stringent,283 while two FTC 
commissioners opposed the final Guidelines in part because they saw the 
document as overly accepting of EDM.284 From a purely historical 
perspective, two changes stand out. First, the Vertical Merger Guidelines 
endorse the “raising rivals’ cost” theory originally developed by Steve Salop 
and David Scheffman in the early 1980s and supported by others following 
the 1984 Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines and pre-AT&T cases.285 
Second, the Vertical Merger Guidelines substantially expand—at least 
relative to the spartan 1984 Guidelines—the discussion of procompetitive 
effects,286 albeit with some new qualifications.287 
Although the economics has radically changed since Brown Shoe and 
the FTC’s cement cases, these precedents remain on the books. And while 
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Fruehauf and now AT&T provide more economically sound counterpoints, 
vertical merger law remains relatively undeveloped as compared to 
horizontal merger law. Therefore, as courts embrace the Agencies’ 
guidelines as part of caselaw development,288 it is critically important that 
courts understand both the underlying economic principles and their 
legal implications for vertical mergers. 
III. Proposed Legal Framework 
We join the chorus who agree with the burden-shifting framework 
applied by the D.C. Circuit in AT&T.289 Yet unlike many commentators, we 
believe RRC and EDM theories are so “inextricably linked”—to borrow a 
phrase from the Horizontal Merger Guidelines290—that a plaintiff alleging 
an RRC theory must also demonstrate that the likely anticompetitive 
harm of RRC exceeds the likely procompetitive benefits of EDM. We also 
identify a few practical impediments to a full-blown Baker Hughes analysis. 
A. The Burden-Shifting Framework 
In United States v. AT&T Inc., the court applied the burden-shifting 
framework announced in United States v. Baker Hughes, which has been 
used in the horizontal merger context, to the vertical merger context. The 
Baker Hughes formulation for a burden shift focuses on certain horizontal 
presumptions based on market shares. As articulated in FTC v. H.J. Heinz 
Co.,291 the formulation works as follows: 
First the government must show that the merger would produce a firm controlling an 
undue percentage share of the relevant market, and [would] result[] in a significant 
increase in the concentration of firms in that market. Such a showing establishes a 
presumption that the merger will substantially lessen competition. To rebut the 
presumption, the defendants must produce evidence that show[s] that the market-share 
statistics [give] an inaccurate account of the [merger’s] probable effects on competition in 
the relevant market. If the defendant successfully rebuts the presumption [of illegality], 
the burden of producing additional evidence of anticompetitive effect shifts to the 
government, and merges with the ultimate burden of persuasion, which remains with the 
government at all times.292 
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A burden-shifting framework is applicable in the vertical merger 
context with certain important modifications. The primary modification 
is the need to account for the significant differences between vertical and 
horizontal mergers. First and foremost, as the court noted in AT&T, 
vertical mergers do not eliminate a competitor.293 Vertical mergers 
therefore lack the primary means of competitive harm found in horizontal 
merger cases and for this reason should be—all else equal—less likely to 
produce anticompetitive effects than horizontal mergers.294 Second, 
unlike horizontal mergers, vertical mergers enhance vertical integration, 
thereby generating both efficiencies and EDM. Thus, they may be more 
likely to produce procompetitive effects.295 
1. Plaintiff’s Prima Facie Case 
In the initial stage of the inquiry and consistent with much of the 
theoretical and empirical literature, a vertical merger should be presumed 
lawful. A plaintiff bears the burden of rebutting this presumption by 
demonstrating that the merger is likely to cause a net anticompetitive 
effect in a relevant antitrust market. This approach is also required by the 
statute, which proscribes only those mergers—whether horizontal or 
vertical—that the plaintiff can prove “may be substantially to lessen 
competition.”296 
As the Vertical Merger Guidelines recognize, plaintiffs today rely 
primarily upon either an RRC theory, a complete foreclosure theory, or 
both. Yet the economics literature demonstrates that a merger that allows 
the parties to raise their rivals’ costs also typically allows them to eliminate 
a double margin—hence, an EDM-RRC tradeoff.297 Indeed, these two 
effects are essentially two sides of the same coin, just that one effect is 
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positive (procompetitive) and the other is negative (anticompetitive).298 Yet 
like matter and antimatter, the two effects are not necessarily always equal 
in magnitude;299 in most circumstances, the economic literature suggests 
that the procompetitive benefits of vertical mergers—including EDM—
will be greater than any anticompetitive effects.300 
Therefore, if a plaintiff brings an RRC case, it should be able to rebut 
the presumption of lawfulness and establish its prima facie case only if it 
can prove both that the merger is likely to raise rivals’ costs and that this 
anticompetitive effect is probably greater than the likely offsetting 
procompetitive effect generated by EDM. We believe we are the first to 
argue that the plaintiff should account for EDM as part of its prima facie 
case.301 In cases such as AT&T, the plaintiff may fail to prove RRC harm in 
the first place. In cases such as the 1970s-era cement cases (if they were 
decided today), the plaintiff may establish some anticompetitive effect 
associated with RRC but fail to demonstrate that these effects are greater 
than the offsetting procompetitive effects of EDM. 
We see no reason why the same test should not apply to allegations of 
complete foreclosure. From an economic perspective, the incidence of 
EDM—a unilateral and essentially automatic effect—should not depend 
upon whether the combined firm decides to cut off rivals entirely or 
merely raise the price it charges them.302 Others seem to agree; for 
example, the EC non-horizontal merger guidelines (“ENHMG”) identify 
both the potential for foreclosure as well as limits to EDM and the 
assumptions behind those limits.303 
The question remains: How does a plaintiff carry the burden to 
address both sides of the vertical-merger coin (RRC and EDM)? Some 
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economists have tackled this question by suggesting merger simulation 
may be sufficient.304 In contrast, the European Commission (“EC”) has 
suggested a more qualitative approach: 
In its assessment of the likely incentives of the merged firm, the Commission may take 
into account various considerations such as the ownership structure of the merged entity, 
the type of strategies adopted on the market in the past or the content of internal strategic 
documents such as business plans.305 
In the next paragraph, the ENHMG add “the Commission examines 
both the incentives to adopt such conduct and the factors liable to reduce, 
or even eliminate, those incentives, including the possibility that the 
conduct is unlawful.”306 How the EC could convert this qualitative analysis 
into a quantitative balancing test remains unclear.307 Understanding 
particular economic mechanisms is important, and we may have greater 
confidence in the explanatory power of a given model if its prediction 
aligns with other evidence, such as unequivocal internal documents. 
Assuming a quantitative economic analysis is necessary, a reviewing 
court or agency must compare one estimate—the projected harms—to 
another—the projected benefits. Although this analysis is necessarily 
probabilistic (e.g., confidence intervals may suggest a ninety percent 
likelihood that a given transaction is net procompetitive), some inferences 
can be drawn from market structure. For example, if the upstream and 
downstream markets are highly competitive, then the anticompetitive 
harms are likely to be both (1) negligible and (2) smaller than the 
procompetitive benefits (including efficiencies assessed in the second 
step).308 Likewise, if the upstream and downstream markets are both 
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monopolized, then the merger will eliminate double marginalization and 
foreclose zero firms (because there are no other firms in either market), so 
the transaction is likely procompetitive. 
Between these outcomes lies most of the real world. Many upstream 
and downstream markets are imperfectly competitive (i.e., oligopolistic or 
monopolistically competitive). In those instances, the dominant 
tendency—procompetitive or anticompetitive—of a merger may be less 
clear, unlike in the horizontal context where the likelihood of 
anticompetitive effects increases, all else equal, as the level of 
concentration in the market increases.309 The cases with unclear vertical 
effects are the ones where it will be important for the plaintiff to prove 
that the merger “may [] substantially lessen competition”310 by 
demonstrating that the harm from RRC likely exceeds the benefits of 
EDM. 
2. Defendant’s Rebuttal 
If the plaintiff makes the requisite showing (after accounting for any 
contrary arguments about RRC or EDM made by the defendant), then the 
burden shifts to the defendant, who must demonstrate that the 
transaction is net procompetitive.311 With the RRC-EDM doppelgänger 
already decided, the rebuttal argument will be limited to traditional 
efficiencies.312 
A number of former agency officials argue that most, if not all, of the 
procompetitive effects of vertical mergers, can be achieved by contract.313 
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Yet this view is not consistent with much of the theoretical economic 
literature, let alone much of the empirical work across economics, 
management, and operations literatures.314 
General Motors’ (“GM”) acquisition of Fisher is perhaps the best 
known real-world example of the limits of contractual mechanisms for 
vertical integration.315 GM entered a ten-year requirements contract to 
purchase all of its automotive bodies from Fisher, which was designed to 
protect Fisher’s investment in new production facilities.316 As one might 
expect from sophisticated parties, the contract also fixed a “cost plus” 
price and included a most-favored nations clause.317 Yet GM quickly 
became dissatisfied with the pricing terms and Fisher’s refusal to collocate 
its production facilities.318 So GM sought to acquire Fisher, initiating the 
process halfway through the contract and completing the transaction with 
three years remaining on the original ten-year agreement.319 The example 
demonstrates how, even when firms actually strike a contract and that 
contract contains a fixed margin (approximately seventeen percent) and 
provisions designed to prevent holdup, contracting can still be far less 
efficient than vertically integrating by merger. 
B. Practical Impediments 
In practice, most cases will stand or fall on the plaintiff ’s prima facie 
case for three reasons. First, the Agencies rarely credit defendant’s 
proffered efficiencies.320 Therefore, if an agency believes RRC likely 
exceeds EDM, that conclusion is usually sufficient to prompt a challenge. 
And because vertical merger litigation is incredibly rare, the vast majority 
of challenged vertical mergers are either abandoned or settled, making the 
agency merger review process the first and last step in the analysis. 
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Second, although the courts have acknowledged vertical merger 
efficiencies, vertical merger cases are rarely, if ever, decided on that basis. 
For example, although the AT&T court applied the Baker Hughes burden-
shifting framework, it stopped at the first step after finding the plaintiff 
had failed to prove that the transaction would allow the merging parties 
to raise rivals’ costs. The same was true in Fruehauf.321 
Third and relatedly, as noted previously, the Agencies’ analysis of 
efficiencies raises a “chicken and egg” problem.322 The Agencies frequently 
discount efficiencies claims either heavily or entirely, arguing that the 
merging parties have failed to substantiate and verify those claims. 
Because the Agencies see few efficiencies stories that meet their standards, 
they tend to approach efficiencies claims with significant skepticism. 
Against this backdrop and because the burden of proving the existence 
and magnitude of traditional efficiencies falls on the merging parties, the 
parties seldom bother to collect the data necessary to make a successful 
efficiencies defense. Solving this “chicken and egg” problem323 will require 
the Agencies to identify the ways in which merging parties can enhance 
their efficiencies advocacy and will require merging parties to invest the 
requisite time and effort in collecting the data and information necessary 
to satisfy the Agencies’ standards. 
Conclusion 
Vertical merger law and policy remain a work in progress. Economists 
have long understood the benefits of vertical integration—including both 
EDM and a bevy of traditional efficiencies. Yet the law has not always 
followed the economics, and in a few infamous cases, the law has run 
directly counter to it. Building upon modern economic literature, a near-
consensus holds that vertical—and other non-horizontal mergers—
typically present fewer competitive concerns than horizontal mergers. On 
occasion, policymakers in the United States have taken this approach, 
including in the 1984 Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines. 
As the D.C. Circuit recognized in AT&T, courts and enforcers need an 
administrable test that integrates near-consensus economic theory. The 
 
 321 See Fruehauf Corp. v. FTC, 603 F.2d 345, 353–361 (2d Cir. 1979). 
 322 See Wilson, supra note 49. 
 323 See, e.g., Christine S. Wilson, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks on Antitrust and Inno-
vation: Still Not a Dynamic Duo? at the Standard Essential Patents Symposium, at 13–14 (Sept. 10, 
2019), https://perma.cc/RP2Z-5UP2; see also Timothy J. Muris, Opening Remarks Before FTC Bureau 
of Economics Roundtable on Understanding Mergers: Strategy and Planning, Implementation, and 
Outcomes (Dec. 9, 2002), https://perma.cc/E6FM-BBZT. 
  
822 George Mason Law Review [Vol. 27:3 
Baker Hughes burden-shifting framework is useful and should be retained. 
At least until very recently, the discussion has missed the recognition that 
EDM and RRC are inextricably linked (if not necessarily of the same 
magnitude) and therefore must be assessed together in the first step. That 
is, if a plaintiff alleges an RRC theory of harm in a vertical merger case, 
then as part of its prima facie case, the plaintiff must also demonstrate 
that the likely anticompetitive harm of RRC exceeds the likely 
procompetitive benefits of EDM. In other words, the plaintiff needs to 
grapple with the unilateral effects tradeoff. Many participants in today’s 
vertical-merger discussion unduly discount the procompetitive benefits 
that a defendant can show in the second step. Participants both ignore 
some classes of efficiencies altogether and impose an unrealistic merger-
specificity requirement more stringent than the one used in horizontal 
mergers. By doing so, the participants ignore or under-emphasize what we 
term holistic efficiencies. We hope that this Article will facilitate further 
dialogue and analysis of these issues in the near term, leading to a firmer 
foundation for the treatment of vertical mergers by the Agencies and 
courts in the future. 
 
